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lAUGHING AT TREATIES
Carlos Manuel Vazquez*
Professor Vazquez argues in this Response that constitutional text, doctrine, and structure-to say nothing of the Founders' intent-rule out Professor Yoo :S claim that all ar most treaties categorically ar presumptively lack
the force of domestic law and thus, unless implemented by statute, can be
disregarded by citizens, the courts, and other officials responsible far enforcing domestic law. The text of the Supremacy Clause plainly gives all United
States treaties, if valid and in farce, the status of domestic law. The cases
recognizing some treaties as non-self-executing fully support a presumption
that treaties are self-executing and hence judicially enforceable in the absence
of statutory implementation. Finally, Professor Yoo's structural arguments
are either implausible ar too general to yield any particular conclusions on
the question of the status of treaties as domestic law.
lNTR.onucnoN

Though ambitious in length and scope, "Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding" 1 is
modest in aim. Professor Yoo examines British and colonial approaches
to treatymaking and enforcement, the experience under the Articles of
Confederation, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention and
some state ratifying conventions, and argues that this material does not
provide "conclusive" or "definitive"2 support for the position that, under
our Constitution, treaties "automatically" take effect as "the internal law
of the United States" once made. 3 Some of this material, he argues, in-

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Daniel
Ernst, Martin Flaherty, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet for their valuable comments and
to Peter Klason for excellent research assistance.
1. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism].
2. Id. at 1962, 2099.
3. Id. at 1976. Professor Yoo dubs this the "internationalist" position-a label that, in
my view, conveys the unwarranted impression that the defenders of this position are
making normative or policy arguments to advance a position they favor on ideological
grounds. Professor Yoo reinforces that impression in his descriptions of the
"internationalist model" and the project of its adherents. See, e.g., id. (internationalists
claim that "international agreements and law ought to be directly merged into the domestic
legal system") (emphasis added); id. ("[T]he internationalist model argues that
international agreements and international law should take effect directly as domestic law
without any intervening legislative action.") (emphasis added); id. at 1977 (suggesting that
internationalists are engaged in "[a]dvocacy of self-execution"). To the contrary, the
defenders of this view have relied on fairly conventional modalities of constitutional
argument, primarily argument based on text, history, and doctrine. I shall refer to what
Professor Yoo calls the "internationalist" view as the "prevailing" understanding regarding
the status of treaties as domestic law in the United States.
I do not criticize Professor Yoo for himself relying on purely normative or policy
arguments. See, e.g., id. at 2093 ("Non-self-execution responds to globalization by
enhancing democratic safeguards ...."); see also the title of his article. To the extent that
2154
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stead supports the position that all or most treaties lack the force of domestic law, and can thus be disregarded by citizens, the courts, and other
officials (state and federal) responsible for enforcing domestic law. 4 He
hopes that, by clearing away this inconclusive underbrush, his work will
"shift the debate on treaty execution toward textual, structural, or doctrinal arguments. "5
Professor Flaherty has convincingly shown that Professor Yoo falls far
short of even this modest goal. 6 Indeed, as Professor Flaherty's Response
demonstrates, a comprehensive examination of the founding material
confirms the constitutional interpretation Professor Yoo attempts to discredit. Because the prevailing view emerges from Professor Yoo's historical mill unscathed, I take this opportunity to engage in the sorts of analyses Professor Yoo thinks potentially more decisive. Although the
conclusion of "Globalism" indicates that the article's purpose was not to
advance a textual, doctrinal, or structural defense of any particular position concerning the status of treaties as domestic law under our Constitutext, history, and doctrine are inconclusive, it may well be appropriate to defend a
constitutional interpretation on the basis of the types of arguments one would make in
drafting a constitution from scratch. Cf. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 310, 311-13 (1992) (analyzing policies
that would be advanced and hindered by alternative constitutional rules on domestic status
of treaties). Defenders of the prevailing view, however, do not regard text, history, or
structure as inconclusive.
The "internationalist" label also misleadingly suggests that the defenders of the
prevailing view seek to encourage international commitments on the part of the United
States. To the contrary, the prevailing view is designed to deter the treatymakers from
entering into treaties lightly. It is Professor Yoo's view which, by diminishing the
significance of a treaty's ratification, would encourage the promiscuous conclusion of
international treaties. Gouverneur Morris recognized this at the Constitutional
Convention, see infra text accompanying note 20, and Professor Yoo himself appears to
acknowledge the point. See John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2231 (1999)
[hereinafterYoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking].
I also note that the scholars Professor Yoo critiques do not agree in all respects. In
describing my own position on the issues Professor Yoo discusses, I emphatically do not
purport to speak for the other scholars Professor Yoo identifies as "internationalists."
Perhaps the biggest point of disagreement among us concerns my acceptance of the
treatymakers' power to deny a treaty domestic legal force through a clear statement in the
body of the treaty or in a reservation. See infra text accompanying notes 123-135. What
we have in common, I think, is that we all agree that the Supremacy Clause establishes at
least a presumption that valid treaties in force have the status of domestic law in the United
States. This is what I refer to as the "prevailing view."
4. That this is the position Professor Yoo espouses is made clear in his Rejoinder, most
starkly in his use of a quotation from Frederick Maitland, to which the title of this article
alludes. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2227. My responses to
the arguments raised in the Rejoinder are found primarily in the Coda. See infra text
accompanying note 210-266.
5. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2094.
6. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095
(I999).
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tion, Professor Yoo says enough about text, doctrine, and structure to
justify a preliminary response. 1 explain in this Response why the readings of the Supremacy Clause that Professor Yoo finds plausible in light of
the founding material are implausible from the textual and doctrinal
standpoints. I also explain why the structural critique Professor Yoo of.
fers of the prevailing view misses its mark. This examination shows that,
even if Professor Yoo had succeeded in demonstrating the inconclusiveness of the founding material, the other modalities of constitutional argument would provide more than ample support for the constitutional interpretation Professor Yoo disputes.
Before turning to text, doctrine, and structure, however, I shall comment briefly on the type of argument that consumes by fur the greatest
portion of Professor Yoo's article-his historical argument. Because this
is the focus of Professor Flaherty's Response, I resist the temptation to
explain how Professor Yoo misinterprets or overreads specific statements
upon which he relies. 7 Instead, I identify some fundamental problems
with the interpretive theory that appears to underlie the structure of Professor Yoo's historical exposition, as well as his critique of the use of the
historical material by defenders of the prevailing view. I call Yoo's theory
the "contractual theory" of original intent because it appears to regard as
binding certain agreements reached at certain ratifying conventions regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Constitution. Part
I describes the theory and explains why it would hold little promise in
interpreting a constitutional provision like the Supremacy Clause, even if
the statements upon which Professor Yoo relies as support for his interpretation were more conclusive than he finds them in the end.
That constitutional text and doctrine offer no firmer ground than
history for rejecting the interpretation of the Supremacy Clause that
prevails among scholars should come as no surprise. Contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestions, not all of the scholars who take this viewS rely primarily on the founding materials. In my view, the position Professor Yoo
disputes is supported most strongly by the text of the Constitution. Concluding that the Constitution gives treaties, once made, "automatic" effect
7. To the extent I have succumbed to the temptation, I have confined my discussions
to footnotes. My discussion of specific statements should not be interpreted as agreement
with Professor Yoo's interpretations of other statements.
8. See generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution
198-204 (2d eel. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760
(1988). My contributions to this literature are Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 695, 697-700 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez,
Four Doctrines]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The "Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee
Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 39, 44-49 (1993) [hereinafter
Vazquez, Se.lf:.Executing Character]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1101-10 (1992) [hereinafter Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights]. Hereinafter, I shall discuss primarily my own positions on the issues
Yoo discusses. I shall refer to the writings of other scholars where appropriate, but mostly
to explain how our positions appear to diverge.
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as domestic law requires only a reading of the Supremacy Clause, which
declares "all" treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land."9 I consider in
Part II whether there are plausible ways to reconcile Professor Yoo's various alternative positions with the Constitution's text. I conclude that
there are not.
I tum in Part III to judicial doctrine. Professor Yoo places much
weight on judicial decisions recognizing a category of treaty that is not
judicially enforceable because "non-self-executing." I regard this as the
strongest support for Professor Yoo's position. Many courts and commentators (including Yoo) take the position that a non-self-executing
treaty lacks the force of domestic law. 10 If so, then the cases recognizing
a category of non-self-executing treaties are incompatible with a literal
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, as they recognize that not "all"
treaties of the United States are the law of the land. I have attempted to
show that the conflict between the cases and the text is less severe than it
at first appears, but I acknowledge that some tension remains.
This tension, however, merely raises the question whether the text or
the cases must give way. Answering the question requires a theory about
the relative weight to be given to text and precedent in interpreting the
Constitution. Some strict textualists take the position that the whole doctrine of non-self-execution is invalid because it conflicts with the
Supremacy Oause.U The approach to constitutional interpretation I
have followed accepts a greater, though limited, role for judicial precedent that deviates from the text. But my approach strives to preserve as
much of both text and doctrine as possible, reading both in such a way as
to minimize the conflict. 12 The Supreme Court cases ProfessorYoo cites
9. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
10. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1978-79; United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 111
cmt. h, reporter's note 5 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]; Henkin, supra note 8
at 203-04;J.W. Peltason, Corwin and Peltason's Understanding the Constitution 114-115
(6th ed. 1973); Alona E. Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45
Am. Soc'y lnt'l L. Proc. 66, 68 (1951);John H. Jackson, United States, in 7 The Effect of
Treaties in Domestic Law 141, 145-46 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987);
Geoffrey R Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 Ohio St. LJ. 781, 831 (1994). Compare Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (stating that "[t]he
Convention is a self-executing treaty .... [Thus] no domestic legislation is required to give
[it] the force of law in the United States"), with United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 667 (1992) (suggesting that a treaty's self-executing character and its status as "Law of
the Land" are separate questions).
11. See Paust, supra note 8, at 782-83.
12. The approach I have followed resembles that elaborated by Richard Fallon in A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189
(1987). See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1114 n.126. For related
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thus lead me to read the Supremacy Clause as adopting a default rule
that treaties have the force of domestic law, a rule that may be reversed by
the treatymakers through a clear statement in the treaty itself (or reservation thereto). This view is tolerably consistent with the Constitution's
text. By contrast, Professor Yoo's view that treaties are not the law of the
land unless implemented by statute is in intolerable conflict with the text.
I address in Part IV a type of constitutional argument to which Professor Yoo often resorts-an argument based on what he sees as the
"deeper structural imperatives" of the Constitution. 13 By this he apparently means the separation-of-powers principles that give the "political
branches"-the President and Congress-and not the courts, the responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. At the general and
abstract level at which Professor Yoo most often deploys them, these arguments are wholly inconclusive. They offer no basis for rejecting the prevailing interpretation of specific separation-of-powers provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Supremacy Clause, which expressly gives judges
a role to play in the enforcement of treaties.
I conclude with some comments on the larger project of unsettling
legal doctrine.
I. Yoo

AND THE

FoUNDING

The great bulk of Professor Yoo's historical analysis is remarkably
consistent with the conventional account. Although the defenders of the
prevailing view might dispute some nuances of Professor Yoo's narrative,
I, for one, have not doubted that the British distinguished sharply between treaties and laws, or that treaties in Great Britain lacked the force
of domestic law unless implemented by Parliament. 14 Nor have I
approaches, see Phillip Bobbit, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982);
Phillip Bobbit, Constitutional Interpretation (1991); Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth
(1996).
13. Yoo, Globalism, supra note I, at 1982.
14. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698. Professor Flaherty does
question the claim that, under the British system that prevailed at the time of the
Founding, treaties lacked the force of domestic law until implemented by Parliament. See
Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2108-10. I will not attempt here to defend my position on this
issue (and Yoo's) as a description of actual British practice at the time. 1t is enough for me
that some (perhaps most) Founders so understood the British approach and attributed the
failure of state courts to enforce the peace treaty to those courts' understanding that state
statutes prevailed over inconsistent treaty obligations. The Convention debates show that
at least some Founders understood the British rule to be as I have described it. For the
propositions that this was the prevailing understanding, that the states' violations of
treaties resulted from their adherence to some version of the British rule, and that the
Supremacy Clause was adopted to "obviate this difficulty," I have relied primarily on the
writings of roughly contemporaneous commentators, Jnstice Iredell in Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States (1833). See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698-99. I recognize
that some Founders questioned whether the British rule was in fact as I have described it.
See Debate at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 3, 1787), in 2 The
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doubted that violations of treaties by the states were a major problem
during the period of the Articles of Confederation, or that the Articles
were widely perceived to be flawed because they did not provide for the
enforcement of treaties against the states. Indeed, I have noted that this
was a key reason for the Framers' decision to draft a new Constitution. As
I have explained elsewhere, the state courts failed to enforce treaties during this period because, adhering to the British rule, they understood
that treaties were not enforceable in court without legislative
implementation. IS
Professor Yoo's disagreement with the conventional account concerns the mechanism adopted by our Constitution to address this fundamental problem. The prevailing view has been that the Founders addressed the problem in the Supremacy Clause by rejecting the British
rule and adopting a different principle for the United States. Professor
Yoo argues that the Constitution instead perpetuated the British rule that
treaties lack domestic legal force without legislative implementation.
Although the Constitution denies the House of Representatives a role in
the making of treaties, Professor Yoo argues that it gives the House the
power to determine whether treaties made shall have the force of domestic law, and thus whether they will be complied with or violated. The
Founders gave the House this power, Professor Yoo argues, to ensure
"that the legislature maintained sufficient checks on executive power"l 6
and that the most representative part of the legislature would "retain the
power to choose how or whether to implement the nation's international
obligations."l7
Professor Yoo claims some support in the Framing Debates in Philadelphia, but in fact these debates show that "the framers were virtually of
one mind when it came to giving treaties the status of law." 18 What is
most striking about these debates is that, after the convention voted to
adopt the provision declaring treaties to be law, no one-least of all the
defenders of the House's prerogatives-proposed to deny treaties the
force oflaw unless implemented by statute. 19 The Framers who objected
to giving treaties the status of law without giving the House a role in their
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 457, 460 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976) [hereinafter Documentary History]. But I cannot see how the fact that some
Founders thought that the British did regard treaties as having the effect of domestic law
even without legislative implementation supports Professor Yoo's argument that our
Constitution denies treaties such effect.
15. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698.
16. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2086.
17. Id. at 2089.
18. Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2120 (quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional
Puzzle: The Treaty Making Clause as a Case Study, 1 Persp. Am. Hist. 233, 264 (1984)).
19. This is all the more striking because the Supremacy Clause was adopted as a
substitute for a proposal to give the legislature the principal role in ensuring state
compliance with treaties. See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1105-06
(discussing proposal to give legislature the power to negative state laws that conflicted with
treaties).
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making proposed to address this seeming anomaly by including the
House in the treatymaking process, not by denying treaties the force of
law. Indeed, the proponents of a House role in treatymaking defended
their position on the ground that it would enhance treaty compliance.
When Madison objected to Gouverneur Morris's proposal to give the
House a role in the making of treaties, arguing that it would make it too
difficult to enter into treaties, Morris replied that he was not disposed to
make treatymaking too easy: The greater the difficulty in making them,
the more seriously they will be taken. 20 That treaties should be taken
20. See 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 393 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter Farrand, Records]. In light of Morris's explanation of his proposal,
Professor Yoo's reading of the comments by WJ.lson and Johnson that immediately follow
are implausible. Wilson, speaking in favor of Morris's proposal, noted that the British
Crown "is under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will impose on the
Senate," as the king is "obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of [treaties]." Id.
Johnson, speaking against the amendment, noted that "The Example of the King of G. B.
was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him-If the Parliament should fail
to provide the necessary means of execution, the Treaty would he violated." Id. Yoo's
reading of these statements as showing that WJ.lson and Johnson "thought that Congress's
legislative powers gave it sole control over a treaty's domestic implementation" is
mysterious. Yoo, Globalism, supra note I, at 2033. WJ.lson merely cites the British rule
requiring Parliamentary implementation as a reason not to be concerned about giving the
House a role in the making of treaties. (Morris had just gotten through clarifying that
under his proposal treaties could not be made without the House's involvement.) If
anything, the fact that WJ.lson was speaking in support of Morris's amendment indicates
that he did not regard this regime as inherent. Johnson was criticizing Morris's proposal,
but he appears to have been making primarily a semantic point. He said "there was
something of solecism in saying that the acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers
from one Body, should depend for ratification on another Body." 2 Farrand, Records,
supra, at 393. In other words, it is inconsistent to say that someone has "full and compleat
power" to make a treaty but at the same time that the treaty is subject to ratification by
another body. He cited the British rule to show that the treaties in Great Britain were
binding once made, but required action by Parliament to ensure compliance. To the
extent he was making a substantive point, he presumably was pressing for a regime in
which the negotiators had full authority to make the treaty without the need for
ratification by another body. His statement that if the Parliament failed to act the treaty
would be violated reads more like a criticism than an endorsement of such a regime.
That WJ.lson did not view a House role in the implementation of treaties to be
inherent is shown clearly by his subsequent renewal of Morris's amendment. He said: "As
treaties ... are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also."
Id. at 538. In discussing this episode, Yoo switches gears. He reads the defeat ofWJ.lson's
proposal as not necessarily endorsing his premise that treaties "are to have the operation of
laws," but merely as a determination that the House's "structural inadequacies" made it
unsuitable for a role in the making of treaties. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2039. A
number of points should be made. First, whatever the reason for the defeat of the
proposal, the fact that Wilson made it shows that Yoo's earlier interpretation of his remark
is untenable. Second, Wilson's premise that treaties are "to have the operation of laws"
shows that WJ.lson was not as incompetent at reading legal texts as Yoo's discussion of his
comments at the ratifying convention would lead one to believe. See id. at 2036. It
provides strong additional support for Professor Flaherty's interpretation of those
comments. Finally, Yoo fails to appreciate that the "structural inadequacies" that render
the House unsuitable for a role in the making of treaties make it just as unsuitable for a
role in their implementation. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2160 1999

1999]

LAUGHING AT TREATIES

2161

seriously once made was common ground. There is not a shred of evidence that anyone wanted to give the House the power to block compliance with treaties already in force. The cavalier attitude towards treaty
compliance that Professor Yoo implicidy attributes to the Founders21 is
nowhere to be found in the records of the debates in Philadelphia.
Professor Yoo also misses the implication for his theory of the Framers' conclusion that the House was "structurally unsuited" for the
treatymaking process: 2 2 The feature of the House that unsuited it for
treatymaking equally unsuited it for a veto over treaty compliance. The
argument that the House must be excluded from the treatymaking process because of the need for secrecy would have had no purchase whatsoever
for someone who assumed that the House would eventually be involved
anyway because the Constitution required House action to implement
treaties. If complying with the treaty would have required House action,
then the prudent course for the treatymakers to follow would have been
to get the House's approval before concluding the treaty. If so, then a
requirement of House action to implement treaties would have been regarded as the substantial equivalent of a requirement of House action at
the stage of making the treaty. 23 If the treatymakers failed to get the
House's approval before making the treaty, they would have had to get it
later. If the House was deemed structurally unsuited for a veto at the
earlier stage, then there would appear to be no reason for regarding it as
better suited at the later stage. The only difference is that a requirement
of House involvement at the later stage would be more dangerous, as it
would make it more likely that a treaty in force would be violated.
In the end, even Professor Yoo appears to concede that the debates
at Philadelphia support the prevailing interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause. He argues, however, that these debates do not deserve much
weight because, after all, the Convention merely resulted in a proposal. It
was the ratifying conventions that gave life to the Constitution, and thus it
is the interpretations of the Constitution reflected in those debates that
are important. 24 He criticizes the defenders of the prevailing view for
relying primarily on the debates at Philadelphia and failing to give adequate consideration to what he regards as the counter-narrative that
emerges from certain ratifying conventions. 25 In his view, these debates
show that the Federalists significantly watered down their position to
meet Anti-Federalist objections regarding the Constitution's freezing of
the House out of the treatymaking process. 26
21. The attitude is made more explicit in the Rejoinder. See Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2227 & n.34.
22. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2036.
23. This appears to have been the gist of the comment by Wilson at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention relied on by Yoo. See infra notes 46--49 and accompanying text.
24. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2039-40.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 2025.
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As Professor Flaherty shows, a fair reading of these debates tells a
very different story, one that is fully consistent with-indeed, buttressesthe interpretation Professor Yoo disputes. 27 Rather than address Professor Yoo's readings of specific aspects of the debate, I ·will comment on the
interpretive theory that appears to underlie his belief that the natural
reading of a constitutional text should yield to an agreement between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists at one or more ratifying conventions regarding the meaning of the text. I call it the "contractual theory" of original intent.
More moderate originalists often say that originalism does not seek
to uncover how the Founders would have resolved specific questions, but
instead seeks to ascertain how an ordinary reader at the time of the
Founding would have understood the words of the Constitution. 28 If this
is the point of the originalist enterprise, a broad array of sources would
supply relevant evidence. It would be appropriate to consult the debates
at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia; the debates at the state
ratifying conventions, even ones that voted not to ratify;2 9 the roughly
contemporaneous writings of participants in the framing and/ or ratifying
conventions, such asJustice Iredell's opinion in Ware3° and ChiefJustice
Jay's charge to thejuryin Henfteld's Case; 31 and even the roughly contemporaneous ·writings of nonparticipants in those conventions, such as Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 32
Some originalists have insisted that it is the understanding of the
Constitution at the ratifying conventions that should be binding, as it is
only as a result of the votes at those conventions that the Constitution by
its terms came into force. 33 Yet dra·wing conclusions about an original
understanding based on the debates at the ratifying conventions is impeded by a number of factors. First, our evidence is far from complete, as
we have records of only some of these conventions, and the records that
do exist are abysmal. 34 Moreover,
[w] e possess neither the equations needed to convert expressions of individual opinion on particular provisions into collective understandings nor formulas to extract from the unstable
compounds of hopes and fears and expectations those elements
27. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2126-51.
28. See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 143-44 (1990).
29. But see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1984 n.129 (criticizing defenders of the
prevailing view for relying on the North Carolina convention because this convention
resulted in a vote not to ratify).
30. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256-80 (1796) (Iredell,J., concurring);
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 697 & n.12; Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra
note 8, at 1110-13.
31. See Benfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099,1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360); Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1103 n.82.
32. See Story, supra note 14; Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 698-99.
33. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 16, 341 (1996).
34. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2103 (citing James H. Hutson, The Creation of the
Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986) ).
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that best predicted how the Constitution would operate in practice. Nor can one tidily graph how these perceptions shifted
over time, as participants on both sides grappled with objections
and counterarguments or thought through the implications of
their own positions.35
Additionally, the heated political context casts doubt on the reliability of
statements made during this process as reports of the speakers' understanding of the document. Particularly suspect are statements made
orally in the heat of a highly adversarial debate (as distinguished from
documents like the Federalist Papers, written in relative tranquility). 36
For these reasons, the best evidence of the ratifiers' understanding of the
document may in the end be the same as the best evidence of the ordinary readers' understanding.37
Although he never develops it in the article, Professor Yoo appears to
be operating under an interpretive theory that employs more specific criteria for assessing the positions taken during the ratification debates. 1
call it the "contractual theory," as it appears to regard as binding certain
agreements reached between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists at
some ratifying conventions. The point ofProfessorYoo's historical narrative appears to be that the Federalists ·watered down their interpretation
of the Supremacy Clause in consideration of the agreement of certain
Anti-Federalists to drop their objections and vote in favor of ratification.
Because this ·watering down was how the Constitution's peddlers succeeded in selling it to wavering buyers, Professor Yoo appears to be arguing, their agreements on those interpretations should be binding.38
35. Rakove, supra note 33, at 134.
36. See id. at 16-17, 132-34. The emphasis in the parenthetical is on "relative." See,
e.g., !.any D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611, 667 (1999); EdmundS.
Morgan, The Federalist, The New Republic, Feb. 26, 1996, at 37.
37. Privileging the ratification may have one valid implication for originalism. If what
is relevant is how the ratifiers understood the document, then any evidence that the
Framers in Philadelphia interpreted a particular provision in a counterintuitive way should
be irrelevant, except to the extent this information was conveyed to the ratifiers. But this
works against Professor Yoo, as it is he who relies on nonpublic evidence to defend a
counterintuitive reading. For example, he relies on statements by Wilson andJohnson at
the Philadelphia Convention that he reads as support for the idea that non-self-execution
was regarded as inherent in the concept of legislation. See supra note 20. He also relies
on an unpublished memorandum written by Madison. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1,
at 2021 (citing James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr.
1787), in 9 Papers of James Madison 345-57 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1975)).
38. Thus, in explaining why Wilson's statements at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention deserve special weight, Professor Yoo writes that "[i]t was the public
explanation of the Constitution's meaning, before the first critical state ratification
convention, that 'sold' the Constitution to its ratifiers." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at
2048. Professor Flaherty likewise reads Professor Yoo to be operating under what I call the
contractual theory. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2134 (noting that Yoo argues that "the
Federalists contorted the Supremacy Clause ... as a price for ratification").
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This theory holds some promise for someone trying to defend as
counterintuitive a reading of the Constitution's text as Professor Yoo's.
Even an agreement among the parties to a contract that a particular provision shall be regarded as meaningless or shall mean the opposite of
what its words denote would be binding. on the parties under the common law.39 This theory would also obviate the question whether the Federalists involved truly understood the words of the document to mean
what they claimed in the debates, or instead embraced the interpretation
for political reasons. Indeed, this theory would make a virtue out of what
appeared to be a liability, as its whole point is that certain political decisions should be binding.40
Despite its potential benefits for someone in the precarious textual
position in which Professor Yoo finds himself, the theory is ultimately unavailing. First, under black-letter contract law, anyone trying to introduce
evidence that a contractual provision was intended to be meaningless, or
to mean the opposite of what it says, is required to present un~ually
probative evidence of a meeting of the minds. 41 Yet, as Professor Yoo
hinlself ultimately admits, the evidence in support ofYoo's position is no
more than inconclusive. 42 Second, to show that an agreement is binding
under the contractual theory requires a showing of causation-i.e., a
showing that the Federalists' watering down of their interpretation actually induced a decisive number of Anti-Federalists to vote to ratify. This
sort of evidence is difficult to come by in any context, but certain features
of the ratification debates make it especially unlikely that the Federalist
39. See infra note 41.
40. An apparent use of something like this theory can be found in Supreme Court
decisions regarding state sovereign immunity. During the ratification debates, some AntiFederalists argned that Article ill permitted individuals to sue states in the federal courts
on their revolutionary war debts. In response, some Federalists argued that nothing in the
Constitution did away with state sovereign immunity, and that Article ill thus conferred
federal jurisdiction in cases between states and individuals only where the state was the
plaintiff. John Marshall made this point at the Virginia ratifying convention. Of course,
the Supreme Court in Chislwlm v. Georgia decided the issue as the Anti-Federalists had
feared, but in response the Eleventh Amendment was adopted. In interpreting this
Amendment as ChiefJustice, Marshall appeared to take a narrower view of state immunity
than he had taken at the ratifying convention, and for this he has been accused of
employing a sort of bait-and-switch tactic. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 482 n.ll (1987), in which Justice Powell accuses Marshall of this.
(The characterization is mine. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur di!lene,
Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh
Amendment Doctrine, 87 Geo. LJ. 1, 88 n.504 (1998).) This accusation suggests a version
of the contractual theory described above. (There are, however, reasons that might justify
this theory's use in the context of state sovereign immuuity that would not apply to the selfexecution issue, the main one being that the view of state sovereign immunity espoused by
the Federalists in selling the Constitution to the Anti-Federalists was arguably later ratified
in a constitutional amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XI.)
41. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 cmt. e (1981); Arthur L. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts§ 542 (1952).
42. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2094.
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statements Professor Yoo points to, even if read as Professor Yoo reads
them, actually switched any votes. As Professor Rakove has emphasized,
the decision facing the ratifiers was "momentous- and binary: whether to
retain the Articles of Confederation or instead adopt a radically different
governmental system. 43 In making that choice, the delegates had to
weigh a multitude of disparate factors. It is highly unlikely that an affirmative vote could be attributed in any meaningful .way to any particular
feature. It is particularly unlikely that many Anti-Federalists were swayed
by Federalist assurances that treaties that had already received the approval of two-thirds of the Senate and bound the United States internationally would lack the force of internal law ·without the consent of a majority of the House. 44
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists could have "relied" on these assurances only if they regarded their own interpretations of the Constitution,
however idiosyncratic, as binding on future authoritative interpreters.
Yet substantial doubts have been raised about whether the Founders embraced a theory of interpretation under which their own views would be
binding on future interpreters. 45 If the delegates regarded their own
statements as merely predictions about how future interpreters would
read the words of the Constitution ·without reference to their intent, then
it is difficult to see how this debate could have generated a binding
"agreement" on any interpretation. Furthermore, some of the statements
that Professor Yoo relies on most strongly were offered as nothing more
43. See Rakove, supra note 33, at 96;Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To
It), 65 Fordham L Rev. 1587, 1604 (1997).
44. To the extent the Anti-Federalists had a common concern, it was that the
Constitution gave too much power to the federal government at the expense of the states.
See J.R. Pole, The American Constitution: For and Against 17 (1987). But treatymaking
already required the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, "which was taken to be the
collective embodiment of the concerns of the states." G. Edward White, Observations on
the Turning of Foreign Affairs jurisprudence, 70 U. Colo. L Rev. 1109, 1119 (1999); see
also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 390,
412 (1998); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2231 (stating that
Framers feared the Senate would be "state-dominated"). Although Anti-Federalists may
well have preferred a narrower treatymaking power, it is far less clear that they would have
been happy with a regime that made it more likely that treaties already made would be
violated. See infra note 50.
45. Compare H. jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not understand their intent to
be an appropriate basis for constitutional analysis), and Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent"
in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1001, 1104 (1991)
(agreeing with Powell), with Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson
Powell, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1033, 1093 (1989) (disputing Powell's conclusion regarding
Framers' disapproval of original intent in constitutional interpretation), Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections
and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 274 (1988) (finding Powell's argwnents against
original intent unpersuasive), and Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77, 77 (1988) (disputing Powell's conclusion
regarding the Framers' disapproval of original intent in constitutional interpretation).
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than predictions of how things might develop. For example, ProfessorYoo
relies on the following statement by Wilson at the Pennsylvania
,
Convention:
[T]hough the House of Representatives possess no active part in
making treaties, yet their legislative authority will be found to
have strong restraining influence upon both President and Senate. In England, if the king_and his ministers find themselves,
during their negotiation, to be embarrassed, because an existing
law is not repealed, or a new law is not enacted, they give notice
to the legislature of their situation and inform them that it will
be necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some law be
repealed or some be made. And will not the same thing take place
here?46
Even if we assumed that Wilson meant to convey the idea that treaties
would lack domestic legal force without legislative implementation, he
formulates this idea, as Professor Yoo himself notes, 47 as a prediction. 48
A prediction is an invitation to agree (or not) on a factual issue-i.e., the
course of future events over which the speaker has no direct control; it is
not an invitation to agree on a binding interpretation. 49
Finally, even if the evidence did establish that the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists "agreed" on a given interpretation at one or two ratifying
conventions, it is unclear why that agreement should be binding on the
nation as a whole. Even if it could be shown definitively that Vrrginia or
New York or Pennsylvania, or all three, would have rejected the Constitu46. James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 11, 1787),
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 14, at 562-63 (emphasis added, following Yoo,
Globalism, supra note 1, at 2047). Professor Yoo omits the remainder of the passage:
"ShaU less prudence, less caution, less moderation take place among those who negotiate treaties for the
United States, than among those who negotiate them for the other nations of the earth?" I d. at 563
(emphasis added).
47. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2047.
48. Technically, it is not even a prediction; it is a question. I shall overlook the
technicality, however, as the question appears to invite the audience to agree that certain
things will happen. Nonetheless, as Professor Flaherty suggests, Wilson here displays an
almost Clintonian talent for studied ambiguity. See Flaherty, supra note 6, at 2130-31.
The passage is thus exceedingly weak evidence of the sort of agreement Professor Yoo
seeks to prove.
49. Wilson's prediction, moreover, was about what the negotiators of the treaty would
do in the future. See supra note 46. It therefore does not support the claim that all
treaties would require legislative implementation. At best (and even this is a stretch), it
would support the claim that the treatymakers have the power to render a treaty non-selfexecuting (something I do not dispute). More likely, Wilson was just observing that, in
those limited situations in which the Constitution specifically requires House involvement
(such as appropriations), the treatymakers would be well advised to get the House's
approval beforehand. This supports the idea that a requirement of House involvement in
implementation is the practical equivalent (for prudent treatymakers) of a requirement of
House involvement in the making of the treaty. The statement thus supports my claim that
the Founders would have regarded the reasons for denying the House a role in the making
of treaties as reasons for denying it a role in treaty implementation as well. See supra text
following note 22.
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tion unless the reference to treaties were read out of the Supremacy
Clause, it would remain a possibility that Massachusetts and New Jersey
and Georgia would have ratified only if the reference to treaties remained
in the clause.5° Indeed, it is precisely because no state had the power to
control the other states as a group that the choice facing each of them
was an up-or-down vote on .the Constitution as a whole. This fact alone
makes it unlikely that the delegates .regarded their role as the reaching of
binding agreements on matters of interpretation. It shows, at any rate,
50. The only argument I can think of to explain why an agreement of this sort at a few
conventions should bind the rest of the nation wonld apply at best only to agreements to
construe federal power narrowly. The argument would begin with two assumptions: (a)
the Anti-Federalists at every state convention objected primarily to the breadth of power
the Constitution gave the federal government at the expense of the states, and (b) the
Federalists at every state convention wonld have preferred the new Constitution, even if
narrowly construed, over the Articles of Confederation. Based on these assumptions
(which I shall grant for purposes of argument), a plausible argument can be made that the
narrowest construction to which the Federalists were forced to retreat at any of the state
conventions shonld be binding because, without the retreat, the Constitution wonld not
have been ratified. (I shall disregard for the moment the problems stemming from the
fact that more states ratified the Constitution than the nine necessary to bring it into force
pursuant to its terms. I will credit Professor Yoo's argument that the enterprise wonld not
have succeeded without Vrrginia, Pennsylvania, or New York. See Yoo, Globalism, supra
note 1, at 2059; cf. Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869,
at 104-06 (1990) (arguing that the conservative Republicans' narrow construction of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment shonld be
binding because their support was necessary for the Amendment's passage in Congress).)
Perhaps an agreement reached at a single convention about the scope of the
treatymaking power could be said to be binding on the rest of the nation on this theory.
See infra Part ill.B.2 (suggesting that one reading of the material Professor Yoo relies on is
that treaties may not be made on matters falling within Art. I, § 8, but r~ecting this
position on doctrinal as well as textual grounds). But if the issue is whether treaties already
validly made by the President and Senate wonld require implementation by statute, the
argument does not fly. One cannot assume that Anti-Federalists would have preferred a
regime in which treaties that bound us internationally would lack the force of internal law
without House action over a regime in which treaties automatically had domestic legal
force once made. Once a treaty is made, every state has an interest in compliance with it,
as noncompliance wonld be likely to produce retaliation against the nation as a whole. For
some states, the interest in compliance might be outweighed by their opposition to the
particnlar terms of the treaty, and, if so, such states might welcome Professor Yoo's rule
with respect to that particular treaty. But for other treaties, the same state might prefer
compliance. Of course, a state that prefers compliance would be free to comply even
under Professor Yoo's rule, but the problem is that Professor Yoo's rule makes it more
likely that other states would fail to comply, thus potentially vitiating the benefits of the
treaty for all the states. A state adopting a cost/benefit approach in choosing a
constitutional rule to govern all future treaties, and trying to decide between Professor
Yoo's regime and a regime giving treaties automatic effect as law, would have to make
difficult predictions about such things as how many future treaties will be to its liking and
the likelihood that the House would fail to implement such treaties. Because it is far from
clear that a delegate concerned with preserving states' rights would prefer Professor Yoo's
rule, it cannot be assumed that, without an agreement at a single convention that treaties
would not have the force of law once made, the Constitution would not have entered into
force.
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why we should not regard any decision made at the ratifying conventions
as binding except the decisi?n to ratify the Constitution's text. 51
For the foregoing reasons, the contractual theory seems both flawed
and unavailing to Professor Yoo. 52 It is only from the perspective of
someone who embraces this theory, however, that the less selective use of
the founding material by the defenders of the prevailing view appears to
be a "confused jumble."53 If one rejects the contractual theory, the point
oflooking at material from the founding would appear to be simply to try
to understand how the ratifiers understood the words of the Constitution.
For the reasons given above, this project is substantially the same as attempting to understand how an ordinary, well-informed reader would
have understood those words. 54
51. Professor Yoo erroneously attributes to me the position that "the ratification
debates are relevant only insofar as they show that the states adopted the Constitution."
Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2222 n.17. In my view, the
ratification debates are as relevant to interpreting the Constitution as other founding-era
materials. All of it is relevant insofar as it sheds light on how the Founders understood the
text of the document they were adopting. My point is that the only decision reached at such
conventions that should be regarded as binding is the decision to adopt the Constitution's
text. I also call into question Professor Yoo's enterprise of relying on these debates to
contradict rather than illuminate the constitutional text. I emphatically do not object to
"using the original understanding at all in constitutional interpretation." Id. Indeed, I
stand by my own prior use of founding-era material. See supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text and infra note 54.
52. In light of Professor Yoo's apparent embrace of this thesis, it is interesting to
consider his interpretation of statements by Wilson and Johnson, suggesting that they
believed the need to implement treaties by statute to be "inherent" in the concept of
legislation. See supra note 20 (discussingYoo's interpretation of Wilson and Johnson). It
is odd to argue that people engaged in the process of writing a constitution wonld regard
any separation-of-powers issue as "inherently" beyond their control. Cf. Naftali Bendavid,
When Congress Tries to Sideline Court, Legal Times, Mar. 6, 1995, at 2, 18 (quoting
Professor Charles Fried as saying that "[t]he idea of an unconstitutional amendment to the
Constitution is stupid"). It is even odder to defend the position these speakers regarded as
"inherent" by reference to their statements. By hypothesis, these persons believed that the
need for legislation would persist no matter what they included in the Constitution. As
Yoo interprets these statements, therefore, they support the position that the Framers tried
to accomplish something (i.e., giving treaties direct effect as law) that in the view of these
speakers a constitution could not accomplish. The only pertinent issue for us is what they
tried to accomplish. If Wilson and Johnson did believe that this could not be
accomplished through a constitution, history has proven them wrong. See infra Part III.B.
53. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1982.
54. Because my intent in consulting this material was to shed light on how the
founding generation understood certain terms, I have cited the Founders' discussion of
those terms even when the discussion did not relate to the particular clause in question.
See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1098 (discussing the Founders'
understanding of the concepts of "law" and "treaties" in the Federalist 15); see also infra
text accompanying notes 62-66 ("intratextual" analysis of the phrase "shall be"). It is only
because Professor Yoo is operating under a more rigid contractual model of interpretation
that he can dismiss my reliance on these sources as irrelevant because they do not relate to
the treaty power. See e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1984.
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Should someone ask me why I think the Constitution gives treaties
the force of domestic law, I would be tempted to respond by paraphrasing George Leigh Mallory's explanation for attempting to scale Mount
Everest: "Because it's there" in the Constitution. 55 The Supremacy
Clause provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the 'supreme Law of the
Land."56 No interpretation is necessary to conclude that this clause purports to give "all" treaties the status of domestic law.
But Professor Yoo is nothing if not bold in the face of constitutional
texts. 57 He concludes that our Constitution does not give treaties the
effect of domestic law once "made" by the President with the consent of
the Senate pursuant to Article II. Instead, he maintains, our Constitution
can properly be read to establish that validly made treaties do not "take
effect as internal U.S. law" until implemented by federal statute. 58 Yoo
does not square his position with the Supremacy Clause's text by arguing
that the clause's reference to the "Law of the Land" is a reference to
something other than "internal U.S. law."59 Rather, he maintains that
Professor Henkin (and many others) erroneously assume that the
Supremacy Clause was meant to give treaties automatic effect as law. 60 He
sees nothing in the Constitution that conflicts with the idea that treaties
have domestic legal force only if and when the House joins the President
and the Senate in passing an implementing statute. 61 In other words, he
thinks the Supremacy Clause can be read as non-self-executing.
This argument, however, overlooks the wording of the clause. The
clause provides that "all" treaties which "shall be made" under the author55. See John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 593 n.2 (16th ed. 1992) ("Because it is
there."). George Steinbrenner also offers some relevant wisdom: "We can't start to talk
about philosophy and intent and spirit of the rule if it's [written] there in black and white."
Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 399 (1985) (quoting George
Steinbrenner) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
57. This was already apparent in his work on war powers, where he has attempted to
show that the clause giving the Congress the power to declare war does not inhibit the
President from employing troops in war without a prior declaration. Yoo reads the clause
instead as merely giving the Congress the power to recognize (or not) that a state of war
exists and to bring about the legal effects that follow from a declaration to that effect. See
generally, John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1169, 1178-79 (1999);John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other
Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 295 (1996).
58. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1962.
59. For example, Professor Yoo criticizes Professor Louis Henkin's statement that our
Constitution "mean[s) that treaties are law of the land of their own accord and do not
require an act of Congress to translate them into law." ld. at 1977 (quoting Henkin, supra
note 8, at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.119 (equating "law of the land" with "domestic law").
60. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977.
61. See id.
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ity of the United States "shall be" the law of the land. The natural reading of that language is that they "shall be" the law of the land once
"made." The only even remotely plausible textual basis for Professor
Yoo's construction would take the clause's use of the future tense to signify that treaties "shall be" the supreme law of the land not once made
but at some later time. So read, the clause would function as an instruction to the lawmakers to pass the relevant statutes. 62 But the clause cannot be read that way. The clause does indeed employ the future tense,
but the future event that triggers the treaty's status as law of the land is
plainly the coming into force of the treaty. The words "shall be" in the
Supremacy Clause apply equally to the Constitution and federal statutes,
yet the clause has always been read to make the Constitution and federal
statutes the supreme law of the land immediately upon their coming into
force. 63
That the term "shall be" in the Supremacy Clause does not denote
non-self-execution is confirmed by its use in other Articles. Article I says
that the legislative power "shall be" vested in Congress, 64 and Article II
provides that the executive power "shall be" vested in the President. 65 In
both contexts, the vesting has been understood to be effective by virtue of
the adoption of the Constitution itself, without the need for additional
legislative action. Article m provides that the judicial power "shall be"
vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may
establish. 66 Here, too, the language has been read as self-executing. The
Supreme Court is understood to possess the whole judicial power, as described in Article ill, Section 2, by virtue of the Constitution itself. 67 With
respect to the lower federal courts, the vesting is understood to be nonself-executing, but that is not because of the use of the term "shall be,"
but rather because of the language making it clear that Congress has the
discretion whether or not to establish lower federal courts. 68
Interpreting the Supremacy Clause to give treaties the force of domestic law only to the extent they are implemented by statute would also
62. As discussed below, even this reading of the clause would conflict with Professor
Yoo's thesis, as he clearly contemplates that the Congress would have discretion whether or
not to pass such legislation. See infra note 126 and accompanying text
63. This is by no means an inherent feature of constitutions or statutes. One can
envision a regime in which a statute is passed but does not have certain effects we normally
associate with supreme law until some other legal act is performed. Indeed, the Framers
considered and rejected a system in which the Constitution and federal statutes would not
necessarily have had the effect of nullifying inconsistent state laws. See generally Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1106 & nn.91& 94 (discussing proposal for a federal
power to "negative" state laws).
64. U.S. Const art I,§ 1.
65. Id. art II, § 1.
66. Id. art III, § 1.
67. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868).
68. See U.S. Const art I, § 8, cl. 9. For a discussion of the pedigree of intratextual
arguments of the sort I make in this paragraph, see Akhil Reed Amar, lntratextualism, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 747, 788-95 (1999).

HeinOnline -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2170 1999

1999]

LAUGHING AT TREATIES

2171

have the unfortunate effect of reading the reference to treaties entirely
out of the Supremacy Clause. A treaty that has the force of domestic law
only to the extent a federal statute gives it such force would not have the
effect of domestic law before or after the statute's enactment; when and if
it is implemented, only the implementing statute would have domestic
legal force. 69 Had the Founders intended to establish such a regime, they
could (and should) have omitted the reference to treaties from the
Supremacy Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause70 would still have
given Congress the power to pass statutes implementing treaties, and the
Supremacy Clause's reference to federal statutes would have sufficed to
give supremacy to any such statutes. Professor Yoo notes that his reading
would treat the Supremacy Clause's reference to treaties "much in the
way that the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the federal government with the authority to pass enabling legislation for other constitutional grants of power."71 He fails to see that this undermines his argument. The Constitution already has a "necessary and proper" clause that
gives Congress the power to implement treaties. 72 A longstanding and
unimpeachable axiom of legal interpretation advises us to strive to avoid
interpretations that render provisions redundant. 73
Perhaps in tacit recognition of the textual difficulty with this broad
position, Professor Yoo advances in the alternative a narrower claim:
Treaties lack the force of domestic laws not categorically, but presumptively.74 Although he is not clear about exactly what is needed to over69. The Restatement makes clear that "it is the implementing legislation, rather than
the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States," for non-self-executing
treaties. Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h (1987).
70. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
71. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979.
72. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("[Congress shall have the power to] make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). This is the clause that has been
understood to give the Congress the power to pass statutes implementing non-self.
executing treaties. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("If the treaty is valid
there can be no dispute about the validity of the [implementing] statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.").
73. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) ("The Court will avoid an
interpretation of a statute that 'renders some words altogether redundant.'" (quoting
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995))); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.
528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute.'" (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882))); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause of the
constitution is intended to be without effect."); see also Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy
Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons & Marathon, 1982 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 25, 30; Maurice]. Holland, The Modest Usefulness ofDOMA Section 2, 32 Creighton
L. Rev. 395, 397 (1998) ("To [attribute identical meaning to two Clauses of the
Constitution] is to violate a fundamental maxim of constitutional and statutory
interpretation to the effect that redundancy is to be avoided.").
74. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2092.
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come the presumption, it does appear that, on this view, the treatymakers
have the power to give the treaties they make the force of domestic law. 75
The reference to treaties in the Supremacy Clause would thus have some
role to play under this interpretation: It would serve as the basis for the
treatymakers' power to determine whether or not the treaties they make
shall have the force of domestic law. Without the clause, their role might
have been thought to extend only to the making of the international
agreement.
But this reading of the Supremacy Clause-which I have called the
"power-conferring" interpretation76-is almost as difficult to square with
the clause's text as a flat rule of non-self-execution. The Supremacy
Clause is not written as a power-conferring provision; it is written as a
status-conferring provision. Article I gives the President the power to
make treaties, with the consent of a supermcgority of the Senate; and the
Supremacy Clause purports to give the treaties they make the status of
domestic law. The claim that the clause is not self-executing runs into the
textual problems noted above, whether the power to execute is alleged to
reside in the lawmakers or the treatymakers. The Supremacy Clause itself
purports to give treaties the force of domestic law. 77
In short, if the question is whether treaties of the United States, validly concluded by the constitutionally appointed treatymakers and in
force, are the "Law of the Land" once made, it is answered by the Constitution's text. The claim that such treaties only acquire the force of "internal U.S. law" 78 once implemented by an internal U.S. law is simply not an
eligible interpretation of that text. The claim that the Constitution establishes a presumption that treaties lack domestic legal force is more plausible, but not nearly plausible enough.
To be sure, the text does not answer all questions concerning the
domestic enforcement of treaties. There remain substantial questions
about what it means to say that the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties have the force of law. Specifically, there remain important questions
about the relationship between the idea that all treaties are the law of the
land and the doctrine that some treaties are non-self-executing. If Professor Yoo's argument that treaties either categorically or presumptively lack
domestic legal force cannot withstand a textual analysis, perhaps his
larger project can be salvaged by casting it as a claim that our Constitu75. See id.
76. See Vazquez, Self-Executing Character, supra note 8, at 46-47 (concluding that
this argument must be rejected, if only on textual grounds).
77. For doctrinal reasons, I ultimately accept that the treatymakers have the power to
determine in certain circumstances that a treaty shall not have the force of domestic law.
See infra Part III.A2. But the tension between this power and the Supremacy Clause's
text, in my view, requires that the Supremacy Clause remain the default rule and that the
treatymakers' power to countermand it be strictly limited.
78. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1962.
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tion establishes either a flat rule or a presumption that treaties are not
self-executing.
The textual problem is not so easily escaped, however. I have argued
elsewhere that our Constitution should be read to establish a presumption that treaties are self-executing, relying in part on the claim that the
concept of a non-self-executing treaty is in tension with the Supremacy
Clause's designation of treaties as "law." 79 One might have expected a
defense of the concept of non-self-execution to attempt to show that I
have misinterpreted the term "law" in that clause-that there is no tension between a treaty's non-self-executing character and its status as
"law."80 But Professor Yoo does not do that. 81 Indeed, he apparently
agrees with the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which maintains
that a non-self-executing treaty lacks the force of domestic law.8 2 As discussed further below, Professor Yoo is unquestionably right in conceding
that a non-self-executing treaty, as he understands the concept, lacks the
force of domestic law. This, however, is exactly why the concept of a nonself-executing treaty is rightly regarded as constitutionally problematic.

III.

JUDICIAL

DoCTRINE

Professor Yoo's position that, notwithstanding the Supremacy
Clause, not all treaties of the United States have the force of domestic law
finds stronger support in judicial precedent than in text or the founding
material. The support consists of the cases recognizing that certain treaties, though in force internationally, are not "self-executing." These cases
offer some support for his position because there is some tension betvveen the concept of a non-self-executing treaty and the Supremacy
Clause's declaration that treaties are "law."
In other work, I discuss the nature of the apparent conflict between
the concept of a non-self-executing treaty and the status of those treaties
as law, and consider whether the two can be reconciled.83 The oftenexpressed sense that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic
law appears to be based on the fact that such treaties, unlike most law,
79. See, e.g., Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 700-10.
80. Cf. Khaldoun A. Baghdadi, Note, Apples and Oranges-The Supremacy Clause
and the Determination of Self-Executing Treaties: A Response to Professor Vazquez, 20
Hastings lnt'l & Comp. L. Rev. 701, 701 (1997) (arguing that Supremacy Clause has no
bearing on whether a treaty is self-executing).
81. Professor Yoo does suggest in passing that the fact that a norm is not judicially
enforceable does not mean that it is not law in some sense. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note
1, at 1967. That he consistently equates a non-self-executing treaty with one that does not
have domestic legal force indicates that he has not quite convinced himself of that
proposition. See id. at 1965-66, 1974, 2036. Moreover, as discussed below, he never
elaborates an understanding of the concept of law under which unexecuted, non-sel£.
executing treaties would be law.
82. See id. at 1972 (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111(4)(a) & cmt. h
(1987)).
83. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 697-723.
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cannot be enforced in court against those on whom the treaty purports to
impose a duty, by those for whose benefit the treaty imposes the duty. In
my view, the understanding of the concept of law reflected in this position is well-founded. I conclude that the Supreme Court cases recognizing that certain treaties are non-self-executing involve relatively unproblematic exceptions from, or refinements of, that understanding of
the concept of law. 84 Nevertheless, the treatymakers, with the help of
some lower courts, have been pushing the doctrinal envelope in a direction that exacerbates the tension between the judicial doctrine and the
Supremacy Clause. Although exactly what they have been doing is disputed, on one view, they have been entering into treaties and purporting
to deny them the force of domestic law by attaching to them a declaration
that the treaty is non-self-executing. With respect to certain treaties, in
other words, the treatymakers have arguably purported to countermand
the ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause.
The doctrine as reflected in these declarations is clearly in tension
with the Supremacy Clause's text. If the treatymakers have the power to
deny a treaty the force of domestic law in this way, then not "all" treaties
of the United States are the law of the land. The Supremacy Clause becomes a default rule, subject to reversal through the acts of the
treatymakers.
If the doctrine is in this respect in tension with the clause, the question arises: Which should give way, the text or the doctrine? In other
words, should we adjust our understanding of the text, or should we reject this aspect of the doctrine? Answ·ering this question requires a theory
of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars have insisted that the
practice of declaring treaties to be non-self-executing is unconstitutional,
and the declarations invalid, because it conflicts with the text of the
Supremacy Clause.85 Unlike these scholars, I accept the authoritativeness
in certain circumstances ofjudicial precedent that deviates from the text.
Despite the apparent tension with the text, I acknowledge that the treatymakers have the power to countermand the ordinary operation of the
Supremacy Clause because, on my analysis, this power falls within the
broad contours of Supreme Court decisions on the self-execution
doctrine.
This recognition gives some surface plausibility to Professor Yoo's
reading (out) of the Supremacy Clause, as it problematizes a literal interpretation of that clause. The concession does not help Professor Yoo
nearly enough, however. Acceptance of a doctrine that deviates somewhat from the text does not justify reading that text entirely out of the
Constitution. The philosophy reflected in the aphorism "in for a dime, in
84. See id.
85. See Thomas Burgenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36
Colum.J. Transnat'l L. 211, 222 & n.36 (1997);JordanJ. Paust, Customary International
Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Law in the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 301,
324-35 (1999).
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for a dollar" has no place in constitutional interpretation. (If it did, we
would have little of the constitutional text left to work with.) The interpretive methodology 1 have followed strives to salvage as much as possible
of both text and judicial precedent. The non-self-execution doctrine, as
recognized in Supreme Court decisions, goes only so far as to permit the
treatymakers to countermand the Supremacy Clause's effects. The
clause's declaration that treaties have the force of domestic law remains
the default rule. The cases support a presumption that treaties are the
law of the land and self-executing. Even if they did not, the fact that they
do not conflict with such a presumption should be enough to require its
adoption on textual grounds. But judicial precedent requires, at most,
the acceptance of a power to countermand the ordinary operation of the
Supremacy Clause. To the extent Professor Yoo would go beyond that,
his position is doctrinally unsupported and, because textually implausible, must be rejected.
In this Part, I first discuss why the concept of a non-self-executing
treaty is regarded by Professor Yoo and others as lacking the force of
domestic law. I then consider whether the Supreme Court cases recognizing the category of non-self-executing treaties can be reconciled with
the Supremacy Clause's text. In this regard, I summarize my claim that
the doctrine in fact encompasses four distinct types of reasons why a valid
law might not be judicially enforceable. I include here a discussion of the
treatymakers' recent practice of declaring certain treaties to be non-selfexecuting, and a brief explanation of my acceptance of their power to do
so through a reservation. In the following Section, I consider the plausibility of the various alternative positions Professor Yoo appears to
espouse.
A. The Concept of a Non-Self-Executing Treaty

At a general level, a treaty-like any law-may be said to be non-selfexecuting when it does not accomplish its aims of its own force.
Although it can arise in other contexts, the question of a treaty's status
usually arises when someone tries to invoke a treaty in a court. A treaty
that is non-self-executing, as the Restatement defines that concept, is simply not enforceable in the courts. 86 It is easy to see why the Restatement
86. See Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § ll1 (3), (4) (1987). The term has
sometimes been used by the lower courts in a broader sense to include treaties that do not
create a private right of action. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719. As I
have written elsewhere, the term "non-self-executing" is ambiguous enough to encompass
such treaties, but a treaty that is non-self-executing in this sense may still be enforceable in
the courts in certain circumstances. See id. at 720. The Restatement's conclusion that
non-self-executing treaties are not the law of the land is plausible only because it takes the
position that "the question of a treaty's self-executing nature is distinct from the question
whether it creates a cause of action." Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h
(1987). Professor Yoo approves of the cases equating the self-execution issue with the right
of action issue. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972-73. His position that non-selfexecuting treaties lack domestic legal force may suggest that he thinks that a treaty that
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would go on to describe such a treaty as lacking the force of domestic law.
The role of the courts in our system of government is to resolve disputes
in accordance with law. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause expressly instructs
state judges to give effect to treaties notwithstanding anything in state
constitutions or laws. Yet a non-self-executing treaty is not cognizable in
the courts, state or federal. It does not, for example, preempt state laws
or provide a defense in a criminal or civil proceeding. The position that
a non-self-executing treaty lacks domestic legal force thus reflects an understanding of the concept of law which ties a norm's legal status to its
enforceability in court against those upon whom the law purports to impose an obligation, by those for whose benefit the law imposes the obligation. The position also reflects the related notion that a law requires a
sanction87-that is, that the legal system must make some provision for
enforcing legal norms against the duty-holder. Elsewhere, I elaborate
and offer a qualified defense of these conceptions of what it means for a
norm to have the force of law. 88
1. The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties. 89 - Notwithstanding
the Supremacy Clause, our courts have long recognized that some treaties are not enforceable in the courts because they are non-self-executing.
In a prior article, I considered the compatibility of this doctrine with the
Supremacy Clause and concluded that this "doctrine" actually encompasses four distinct types of reasons why a treaty might legitimately be
considered judicially unenforceable. 90 As long as the four doctrines are
confined to their proper scope, they are tolerably compatible with the
Supremacy Clause's designation of treaties as law. But, like the analogous
doctrine under which certain constitutional provisions are said to raise
political questions, this doctrine should be regarded as problematic precisely because, if broadly construed, it is in tension with the conviction
does not create a private right of action is not judicially enforceable in any circumstances.
If offered as a description of current doctrine, his claim is inaccurate. See, e.g., Kolovrat v.

Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191 (1961) (relying on treaty as defense to state action to take
property);Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 130 (1928) (relying on treaty to obtain writ of
mandamus requiring action by state official); Asakura v. City of Seatde, 265 U.S. 332, 343
(1924) (relying on treaty to obtain restraining order preventing application of state law
that violated treaty). If offered as a proposal for doctrinal evolution, the suggestion makes
no sense. See infra text accompanying notes 172-173. In discussing the claim that a treaty
that is non-self-executing lacks the force of domestic law, I will use the term "non-selfexecuting" to refer only to non-self-executing treaties that are not judicially enforceable
under any circumstances.
87. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
88. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Constitution as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and Judicial Review (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Vazquez, Constitution as Law of the Land].
89. I discuss the four categories of non-self-executing treaties here in a different order
than in "The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties." To avoid confusion, I shall
refrain from referring to the doctrines by reference to the order in which I have discussed
them (e.g., the first category, second category, etc.).
90. See generally Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8.
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that law is judicially enforceable by the individuals whose rights it purports to govern. The Supreme Court's self-execution decisions, like its
political question decisions, can and should be read to construe our Constitution to establish a presumption of judicial enforceability.
a. Unconstitutional Treaties. - One of the four categories of non-self.
executing treaties consists of treaties that purport to accomplish what is
beyond the powers of the treatymakers under our Constitution. Such
treaties may be said to lack the force of domestic law for the same reason
unconstitutional statutes are thought to lack such force. To the extent
they purport to accomplish what is beyond the treatymaking power, they
are invalid.
A treaty might in theory be invalid because it purports to do something that neither the federal nor state governments may do under our
Constitution. A treaty that restricts the freedom of speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment would be an example. Such a treaty is
void as a matter of domestic law. Other treaties may attempt to accomplish something that is within the power of the federal government but
beyond the power of the treatymakers. Such treaties are unconstitutional
because they intrude upon the exclusive powers of the legislature. They
purport to do what, under our Constitution, can only be accomplished
through a statute. These treaties might be, and have been, described as
"non-self-executing."91 They are in force internationally, but because of
the way our Constitution divides powers between the treatymakers and
the lawmakers, they cannot accomplish their goals of their own force.
They require implementation.
One example of something that, under our Constitution, can only be
done by statute is the appropriation of money. During the Jay Treaty
debates, everyone assumed that an appropriatiotl. would require action by
the House. The debate was about whether the House was duty-bound to
appropriate the money simply because the treaty was the law of the land,
or instead had discretion to decline to appropriate the money if it objected to the treaty. The latter position has prevailed, a position that indeed seems to follow from the premise that an appropriation requires a
law. The idea that the legislature can be legally bound to enact legislation is foreign to us.9 2 In any event, any such "duty" would be wholly
unenforceable. To say that the House is under a duty to appropriate the
money and that, if it does not, it can be ordered to do so, is to trivialize
the requirement of House action. And to recognize that the "duty" is
unenforceable is to trivialize the duty.
If we reconcile treaties that purport to appropriate money with the
Supremacy Clause by regarding them as unconstitutional, it would appear to follow that the treatymakers are legally bound not to conclude
91. For a more thorough discussion of these types of treaties, see Vazquez, Four
Doctrines, supra note 8, at 718-19.
92. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 972 n.1 (1997) (Souter,J., dissenting).
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such treaties, at least not before obtaining the necessary appropriation
from the House. That we instead say only that the treaty is non-self-executing reflects the same view about the nature of a legal obligation that
underlies the statement that a non-self-executing treaty is not the law of
the land-that is, it reflects the conviction that a supposed duty not enforceable against the duty-holder, either judicially or otherwise, is not
truly a legal duty. Perhaps if the impeachment power had come to be
used against Presidents who entered into such treaties, the idea that the
President lacks the constitutional power to conclude such treaties might
have taken root. 9 3 In any event, a President who knows that appropriations require action by the House would presumably not enter into a
treaty purporting to appropriate money (and the Jay Treaty did not purport to do so94). A prudent President would refrain from entering into
an unconditional obligation to do something that requires an appropriation without getting the House's approval beforehand. He would be
more likely to agree to "propose" action to the Congress, to "use his best
efforts" to achieve the desired ends, or to attach a reservation or declaration alerting the other parties to the constitutional role of the House.
Treaties phrased in any of those ways would not be unconstitutional, but
they would fall into one or more of the other categories of non-self-executing treaties.
b. Nonjusticiable Treaties. - Like the previous category, the next category of non-self-executing treaties reflects separation-of-powers notions.
This category, however, reflects the Constitution's allocation of powers
among the branches of our federal government with respect to the enforcement, rather than the making, of treaties. This category consists of treaties that are not judicially enforceable because they establish a type of
obligation whose enforcement our Constitution allocates to a branch
other than the judiciary. As noted, our legal tradition recognizes a link
between law and courts. Thus, by declaring treaties to be law, the
Supremacy Clause appears to allocate their enforcement to the courts.
But our legal tradition also recognizes certain limits on the judicial enforceability of laws. The courts are regarded as the proper enforcers of
certain types of norms but not others.
The most pertinent limitation can be traced to Marbury v. Madison:
"The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."95 A treaty, therefore, is notjudicially enforceable if it does not con93. Given the requirement of Senate consent to treaties, however, it is easy to see why
this power was never used in this way.
94. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat.
116, 120.
95. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The courts, of course, decide on the rights of
individuals whether such individuals are plaintiffs or defendants. That is why the Marbury
dictum is not in conflict with the fact that courts often enforce public rights at the behest
of government, for example in criminal cases. Even in such cases, it may be said that the
role of the court is to protect the rights of individuals. The rights of the public (as
distinguished from the individual) could in theory be enforced without the involvement of
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fer rights. 96 A treaty does not confer a right if it does not impose an
obligation. This is why a precatory or hortatory treaty is not judicially
enforceable. Such treaties are sometimes said to be non-self-executing,97
but the label in this context signifies something very different from what
it means in the case of an unconstitutional treaty. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prevents the treatymak.ers from entering into treaties
with precatory or aspirational provisions.
That the courts may not enforce such provisions is not problematic.
Such treaties might be said to impose obligations of a sort, just as the
Constitution's preamble might be said to obligate the Congress to seek to
"promote the general welfare." But, in both cases, the "obligations" are
not thought to create correlative legal rights. They might be described as
moral obligations. Determining how to implement an aspirational provision requires the balancing of a number of competing demands on our
resources, and this sort of balancing is something our Constitution assigns to the legislative branch. The formal conclusion that such provisions do not create legal "rights" might be thought to reflect this division
of powers among the branches of the federal government.
Precatory provisions might be regarded as part of a broader category
of nonjusticiable provisions. Another type of nonjusticiable provision
consists of those that are too vague for judicial enforcement. Like constitutional and statutory provisions, a treaty may be judicially unenforceable
because it does not offer "judicially manageable standards." 98 The formal
and functional reasons for concluding that such provisions are not enforceable in the courts are similar to the rationales for finding precatory
provisions to be non-self-executing. A vague treaty provision does not
courts, but such enforcement is too likely to trample the rights of individuals. It is to
protect the latter that the executive is required to resort to courts if it seeks to deprive
people of liberty or property.
96. This principle has produced a great deal of confusion among the lower courts
with respect to the standing of individuals to enforce treaties in the courts. Some courts
have denied relief to individuals based on the notion that treaties, as a matter of
international law, confer rights only on states. Of course, if this were relevant, treaties
would never-or virtually never-be enforceable by individuals in our courts. I have
argued elsewhere that as a matter of international law individuals generally lack "rights"
under treaties only in the sense that they generally lack standing to enforce the correlative
obligations of states at the international plane. The Supremacy Clause's declaration that
treaties are domestic law was desigued to make treaties enforceable at the domestic plane.
Since the role of the courts at the domestic plane is to enforce the rights of individuals, the
Supremacy Clause is best read to give individuals standing to enforce treaties that obligate
the state to treat them in a given way. See generally Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra
note 8, at 1133-41. Thankfully, there is no need to address the standing issue here. A
treaty that is not self-executing, as Professor Yoo uses the term, is not enforceable in the
courts at the behest of anyone, presumably including other nations. I invoke ChiefJustice
Marshall's dictum about the role of the courts only insofar as it tells us, indirectly, that a
treaty is not judicially enforceable if it does not establish obligations.
97. See, e.g., INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 429 n.22 (1984) (stating that Article 34 of
Refugee Convention is "precatory and not self-executing").
98. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
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"prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may
be determined." 99 It leaves the parties with much discretion about how
to comply, and in our system of government it is for the legislature to
exercise that discretion.
It may be that even certain mandatory and determinate treaty provisions are nonjusticiable as a constitutional matter. Analogously, the political-question doctrine is said to reflect the idea that the enforcement of
certain constitutional norms has been allocated by the Constitution to a
branch other than the judiciary. 100 Sometimes the conclusion that the
Constitution allocates the enforcement of a constitutional provision to
the nonjudicial branches is based on the precatory or vague nature of the
norm, but sometimes it is based on constitutional text1 0I or structure.I 02
It cannot be said that the Constitution allocates the enforcement of treaties generally to a branch other than the judiciary, but perhaps a court
could legitimately construe the Constitution to place treaties concerning
certain subjects-arms control, for example-beyond the enforcement
power of the courts. Alternatively, the unenforceability of such treaties
might be explained by the more general principle 1 traced above to Marbury v. Madison: An arms-control treaty might be said to be judicially unenforceable because it does not confer rights on individuals, as individuals are not its objects.I03
This is not the place to explore the outer boundaries of this category
of non-self-executing treaties. What is important for present purposes is
to recognize that this category includes treaties that are not judicially enforceable because of the way our constitution allocates the power to enforce treaties that are validly concluded by the treatymakers. Like the
political question doctrine, this category of non-self-executing treaties
should be regarded as an exception to the general rule that laws are judicially enforceable.l 04
99. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
100. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 218-29; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118, 140-51 (1912).
101. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
102. The nonjusticiability of disputes about whether the constitutional norms
regulating the amendment process have been complied with has been defended on
structural grounds. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 Yale LJ. 517, 596 (1966); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,
457-60 (1939) (Black,J., concurring).
103. Explaining the nonjusticiability of such treaties on this ground would mean
extracting from the Marbury dictum the principle that domestic courts do not enforce the
rights of sovereign states. Cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 11-12, Republic of
Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770) (arguing that foreign states
lack standing to maintain actions under treaties in domestic courts). But see Brief Amicus
Curiae of a Group of Law Professors at 5-6, id. (disputing U.S. brief).
104. Professor Yoo argues that separation-of-powers notions require the conclusion
that treaties always, or presumptively, are judicially unenforceable in the absence of
implementing legislation. I address these separation-of-powers arguments in Part IV.
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c. Treaties Addressed to the Legislature. - The foregoing categories of
non-self-executing treaties are simply versions of doctrines that apply
equally to constitutional and statutory provisions. To the extent the term
"non-self-executing" describes a doctrine unique to treaties, it refers to
what I have called the "intent-based" category. 105 It consists of treaties
that are addressed to the legislature in the sense that the obligation they
impose is an obligation to pass domestic legislation.
Foster v. Neilson is the prototype of this category. 106 At issue in that
case was whether a treaty between the United States and Spain ratified
and confirmed certain Spanish grants of land of its own force or instead
required the United States to "pass acts" (i.e., legislation) to ratify and
confirm the grants. 107 The Court acknowledged that, if the treaty had
provided that the grants were "hereby" confirmed, it would have been
self-executing and would accordingly have governed the question of title.Ios But the Court read the treaty as "stipulating for some future legislative act." 109 The Court relied on the English text, which provided that
the grants "shall be ratified and confirmed. "110 It read this language as
contemplating a future act of ratification. In a later case involving the
same treaty, United States v. Percheman, 111 the Court confessed error. This
time, the Court had before it the Spanish text, which said that the treaties
"shall remain ratified and confirmed. "112 This, the Court held, was the
language of self-execution.
Foster recognizes that a treaty is not self-executing if the obligation it
imposes is an obligation to enact domestic legislation. It is important to
distinguish this category from the two categories discussed earlier. The
determination that a treaty is non-self-executing because unconstitutional
or nonjusticiable turns on an interpretation of the Constitution. The first
reflects the conclusion that the treaty was invalidly made; the second the
conclusion that the treaty, though validly made, imposes an obligation
whose enforcement our Constitution allocates to nonjudicial branches.
In Foster, by contrast, the self-execution question turned on an interpretation of the treaty. Treaties that fall in the first two categories may be said to
be "addressed to the legislature," but only constructively. The necessity
for legislative action is a consequence of a constitutional disability (in the
first case, a disability of the treatymakers; in the second case, a disability
of the courts). The Foster category consists of treaties that are actually
addressed to the legislature. The content of the obligation imposed by
the treaty is the enactment of legislation. According to Foster, such trea105. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 700-10.
106. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
107. ld. at 314.
108. ld. at 314-15.
109. This characterization of the holding comes from the later case of United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
110. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315.
111. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
112. ld. at 88.
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ties are not enforceable in the courts. With respect to such treaties, the
role of the courts is merely to enforce the statute passed by the legislature
to implement the treaty.113
d. Treaties That Do Not Create Private Rights of Action. -Increasingly,
lower courts have been using the term "non-self-executing" to refer to
treaties that do not themselves create a private right of action. 114 The
Restatement, on the other hand, insists that the self-execution issue is
distinct from the question whether a treaty creates a private right of action.115 It is true that the doctrine recognized in Foster does not have to
do with the existence of a private right of action. The plaintiff in Foster
had invoked a right of action at common law; he relied on the treaty
merely to establish his title to the property. But I have attempted to show
that, outside the treaty context, courts often use the term "self-executing"
(and hence "non-self-executing") to refer to laws that do not create remedies or rights of action. 116 Once it is recognized that the term "non-seU:
executing" is not a term of art restricted to treaty law, but instead refers to
a number of possible reasons why a law might not be judicially enforceable without prior legislative implementation, there is little reason to deny
the label to treaties that contemplate but do not create a private right of
action. Constitutional provisions, for example, have frequently been described as self-executing (or not) with respect to remedies. 11 7
There is, however, an important difference between treaties that are
non-self-executing in the first three senses of the term and treaties that
are non-self-executing in this fourth sense. In the first three cases, a nonself-executing treaty is not judicially enforceable under any circumstances. A treaty that is non-self-executing in the fourth sense is judicially
unenforceable only when it is invoked by someone who seeks to maintain
an action and has no other legal source for his right of action. Someone
who invokes a treaty as a defense does not need a right of action. 118 Ad113. Professor Yoo erroneously attributes to Professor Henkin an excessively narrow
understanding of the concept of a non-self-executing treaty. He says that Professor Henkin
wonld recognize a treaty as non-self-executing only if it imposes on the parties the
obligation to accomplish through future legislative action something that the Constitution
exclusively assigns to Congress. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977. Professor Yoo
thus suggests that Professor Henkin would regard as self-executing a promise of future
legislative action on a matter not exclusively assigned by the Constitution to Congress, or a
treaty on a matter exclusively assigned to Congress that is not framed as a promise of future
legislative action. Professor Henkin has never taken such a position. See Henkin, supra
note 8, at 203.
114. See, e.g., Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir.
1992); United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Bent-8antana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring).
115. See Restatement (Third), supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h (1987).
116. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 721.
117. See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1969).
118. For example, if Texas makes conduct X a crime, and a treaty provides that the
parties shall not regard conduct X as a crime, someone being prosecuted in Texas for
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ditionally, it is unnecessary to rely on a treaty as the source of a private
right of action if another law provides a private right of action. For example, someone seeking damages or an injunction against a state official
who has allegedly violated a treaty may rely on Section 1983 for his right
of action. 119 Someone who seeks an injunction ordering a federal official
to stop violating a treaty may rely on the Administrative Procedure Act for
his right of action. 120 As Foster illustrates, historically treaties were not
relied upon as the source of the plaintiff's right of action. The treaty
governed the rights and duties of the parties, but the common law provided the right of action.
The lower court opinions most frequently cited for the proposition
that a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not create a "private right
of action" were written in cases in which the treaty was being invoked by a
plaintiff suing a private individual or a foreign state in circumstances in
which for jurisdictional reasons, there was a need to find a federal right
of action. In such circumstances, there may in fact have been a need to
determine whether the treaty itself conferred a right of action. Unfortunately, the dictum in these cases-to the effect that a treaty that does not
create a right of action is non-self-executing-has been ·wrenched from its
context and applied in cases in which there should have been no need to
ask whether the treaty itself created a right of action. 121
2. Are Non-Self-Executing Treaties "Law"? - As the foregoing analysis
suggests, there is no single answer to the question whether a non-selfexecuting treaty is "law." A treaty that is non-self-executing because it
does not create a private right of action is plainly "la·w" under even the
narrowest definition of that term. Not all laws create private rights of
action; a treaty that does not create a private right of action may still be
enforced in court in certain circumstances. On the other hand, a treaty
that is non-self-executing because it is unconstitutional may unproblematically be described as not law. To the extent it exceeds the treatymaking
power, it is invalid. Treaty provisions that are nonjusticiable because they
are precatory or aspirational might be said to be law, but the characterization is not meaningful because of the provision's content: It does not
purport to obligate the parties to do anything in particular. The same
might be said of treaty provisions that are nonjusticiable because they are
vague.l22
conduct X should be able to rely on the treaty as a defense, even if the treaty does not
create a private right of action.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (permitting suits against state officials for violations of
federal Constitution or laws).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (establishing judicial review of legal wrongs caused by
federal agency action).
121. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719.
122. To the extent a mandatory and determinate treaty proVISion is deemed
nonjusticiable for other separation-of:.powers reasons, the question of its status as law is
more complicated.
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Whether a treaty "addressed to the legislature" is law is a more complex question. An example will aid our analysis. Consider a treaty that
provides: "Do not deport refugees." 123 (I shall hereinafter refer to this as
a Type A treaty.) If the relevant concepts (e.g., "deport" and "refugee")
are sufficiently determinate, such a provision would be self-executing on
my analysis. Upon the entry into force of the treaty, by virtue of the treaty
itself (and the Supremacy Clause), the corpus of federal law in the
United States would include a norm prohibiting the deportation of refugees. Now assume a treaty that provides instead: "Pass legislation prohibiting the deportation of refugees" (hereinafter a Type B treaty).l24 Such
a treaty is plainly non-self-executing under Foster. Although the treaty
contemplates the creation of a domestic-law norm identical to the one
created by the first treaty, such a norm does not become part of the
corpus of federal law by virtue of the entry into force of the treaty. Indeed, one might say that a Type B treaty is non-self-executing because it
does not, of its own force, create a Type A law.
But what about the norm addressed to the legislature? Is the norm
"Pass a law barring the deportation of refugees" part of the corpus of
federal law in the United States by virtue of the entry into force of the
treaty? The text of the Supremacy Clause would appear to require an
affirmative answer. Yet, it is also clear that this norm is not enforceable in
court. The norm can be violated by the legislature with impunity.
Whether we regard such a norm as law depends on how we define law.
The norm would not be law if we linked the legal status of a duty to its
judicial enforceability or the existence of some other mechanism for enforcing it against the duty-holder. Professor Henkin, on the other hand,
argues that such norms are indeed law:
Whether [a treaty] is self-executing or not, it is supreme law of
the land. If it is not self-executing, Marshall said, it is not "a rule
for the Court"; he did not suggest that it is not law for the President or for Congress. It is their obligation to see to it that it is
faithfully implemented; it is their obligation to do what is necessary to make it a rule for the courts if the treaty requires that it
be a rule for the courts ....125
Professor Henkin thus reconciles the concept of a non-self-executing
treaty with the Supremacy Clause by embracing a broader conception of
"law."
Professor Henkin's rationale for reconciling a non-self-executing
treaty with the Supremacy Clause is unavailable to Professor Yoo, however. First, a non-self-executing treaty, as Professor Yoo understands the
123. More likely the treaty would provide that all parties agree not to deport refugees.
The provision quoted in the text is the equivalent for purposes of analyzing the selfexecution question.
124. Again, the treaty is more likely to provide that all parties agree to pass legislation
prohibiting the deportation of refugees.
125. Henkin, supra note 8, at 203-04.
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term, would not be law even under Professor Henkin's less demanding
test. Even if one were to grant for purposes of argument that a norm can
be law even though it can be violated by the duty holder without legal
consequences, surely one would have to insist that such a norm is law only
if it is binding on the duty holder. Professor Henkin can describe such a
norm as law because he insists that the Congress is legally bound to comply with it. Professor Yoo, on the other hand, forthrightly defends his
thesis by arguing that the political branches should have the flexibility to
violate the norm. 126 This position is not entirely implausible. If the Constitution requires action by Congress to implement a non-self-executing
treaty of the type hypothesized above, then presumably it does so for a
reason. In the case of a treaty that is non-self-executing solely because it
is framed as a requirement of legislation, 1 2 7 it is plausible to conclude
that the reason is to leave Congress the legal option of violating it. But, if
Professor Yoo's position is that treaties are not even theoretically binding
on the nonjudicial branches, treaties would not be law in even the least
demanding sense of that term.
Second, a looser understanding of the term "law" does not help Professor Yoo because he does not restrict the concept of a non-self-executing treaty to Type B treaties. He would regard Type A treaties as non-selfexecuting, either categorically or presumptively. This position is in conflict with the Supremacy Oause, no matter how we interpret the term
"law." According to the terms of that clause, the entry into force of a
treaty norm having the content "Do not deport refugees" results in the
existence of a domestic law norm having the same content. Professor Yoo
denies this. He insists instead that the entry into force of a treaty norm
having the content "Do not deport refugees" results in the existence, at
best, of a domestic law norm having the content "Pass legislation prohibiting the deportation of refugees." A less demanding definition of "law"
helps Professor Henkin explain why a treaty having the content "Pass legislation prohibiting the deportation of refugees" is law even though it is
unenforceable; such a definition cannot explain why a treaty having the
content "Do not deport refugees" should be treated as a law having the
content "Pass laws prohibiting the deportation of refugees." Professor
Yoo would find the authority for treating the former as the latter in the
Constitution, yet the most relevant thing the Constitution says on the
matter is that a treaty having the content "Do not deport refugees" is itself
law.
Unlike Professor Henkin, I am inclined to question the status as
"law" of a norm that can be disregarded with no legal consequences. It is
126. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979.
127. As noted above, the categories of non-self-execution might overlap, and thus a
treaty that expressly contemplates future acts oflegislation might do so because the parties
regarded the provision as precatory or vague. A treaty would be non-self-executing solely
because it is framed as a requirement of future legislation if it is not also precatory or
vague.
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for this reason that I argue the Supremacy Clause provides textual support for a presumption that treaties are self-executing (a presumption
that finds independent support in the cases). But the question whether a
Type B treaty is law is less interesting, and less pertinent, than the question whether a Type A treaty should be treated as a Type B law. That
Professor Henkin is willing to regard a Type B treaty as law even though it
is not judicially enforceable does not mean that he would find it unproblematic to say that a Type A treaty is law even though it is judicially
unenforceable. He might take the position that treaties are law only if
they bind the norm subject. In the case of a Type B treaty, the normsubjects are the legislature and the executive (in its lawmaking capacity).
In the case of our hypothesized Type A treaty, the norm subjects would
be any government officials involved in deporting people-the executive
(in its law executing capacity) and the courts. Professor Henkin might
take the position that a Type A treaty would be law only if the executive
were bound as a matter of domestic law to refrain from deporting refugees, and the courts were bound in a deportation proceeding against a
refugee to rule that the deportation is prohibited. He might accordingly
take the position that the Supremacy Clause requires that "all" Type A
treaties be binding on judges to the extent they purport to address the
rights of individuals before the court.
There is much force in this analysis, but an examination of the treatymakers' recent practice of attaching non-self-executing declarations to
human-rights treaties leads me to conclude that the treatymakers do have
the power to enter into a Type A treaty obligation that is not binding on
judges and other law-applying officials. Although the purpose of these
declarations is a matter of some dispute, on one view these declarations
seek to render non-self-executing a treaty provision that othenvise would
be self-executing. 1 2 8 What the declarations mean by "self-executing" is
also unclear. The Senate Reports attached to some of the treaties indicate that the declarations mean merely that the treaty does not create
private rights of action, 129 thus leaving open the possibility that the treaty
may be enforced defensively or pursuant to generic rights of action, like
the APA or section 1983. With respect to other treaties, however, the
Senate Reports indicate that the declarations mean that the treaty lacks
the force of domestic law. 130 It is possible, then, that by attaching the
declaration to the treaty, the treatymakers intended to deny domestic
legal force to a treaty that would othenvise be self-executing in every
128. Scholars have argued, however, that the declarations were not intended to be
binding on the courts. See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human
Rights: Non-Self:.Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. lnt'l L.
129, 135-36 (1999).
129. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights); see also S. Exec. Rep. No. 103-29, at 8 (1994) (International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
130. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 10 (1990) (Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
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sense of the term. If this were the treatymakers' intent, the declarations
may be characterized as an attempt to countermand for a given treaty the
rule that the Supremacy Clause would otherwise establish.
Some scholars maintain that, if the declarations do purport to countermand the Supremacy Clause, they are unconstitutional. 131 Professor
Henkin's position is less clear. He has called the practice of attaching
such declarations to treaties "anti-Constitutional" 132-an unconventional
term that he may be using advisedly to denote something other than unconstitutional. Iss I agree that the practice is contrary to the spirit that
animated the Supremacy Clause. It certainly conflicts with the evident
desire of the Founders to "show the world" that we take our treaty commitments seriously by making them enforceable in the ordinary courts. 134
Contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion, 135 however, I have never taken
the position that such declarations are invalid. 1 36
It is unnecessary for present purposes to resolve the interpretive or
constitutional issues surrounding these declarations. It suffices to consider instead the constitutionality of a hypothetical "non-self-executing"
reservation attached to a treaty that would otherwise clearly be self-executing. By hypothesizing a reservation rather than a declaration, we
avoid the issues stemming from the uncertain effect of declarations on
the international obligations established by the treaty. To avoid the ambiguities surrounding the intended meaning of the declarations, I shall assume that the reservation clearly states that the treaty "~oes not have the
force of domestic law." Would such a reservation be valid and effective?
If one accepts Foster, then in my view one must accept the validity and
effectiveness of such a reservation. Foster held that the treatymakers could
render an otherwise self-executing norm non-self-executing by framing it
as a requirement of future legislation. Thus, the contemplated domestic
law norm "Do not deport refugees" is denied effect as domestic law if it is
embedded in a provision framed as "Pass legislation barring the deportation of refugees." The same result must follow if the "non-self-execution"
provision appears in a separate part of the treaty. Thus, Article 1 of a
treaty, which considered alone would be self-executing, can be denied
domestic legal force by Article 27 of the treaty, which provides that "the
requirements of Articles 1-26 shall be achieved through future acts of
domestic lawmaking." Assuming the other parties to the treaty do not
131. See Burgenthal, supra note 85, at 222 & n.36; Paust, supra note 85, at 324-25.
132. Henkin, supra note 8, at 202.
133. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 63 (1990)
(arguing that such declarations are misguided). But cf. Henkin, supra note 8, at 477 n.100
("[I]f what I wrote [in a previous article] can be read to support a general policy of
declaring all treaties, or a category of treaties, to be non-self-executing, I do not hold that
view.").
134. James W!lson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 7, 1787),
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 14, at 514, 518.
135. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1959.
136. See, in particular, Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 708 n.61.
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object to it, the identical statement in a reservation to the treaty would
have exactly the same effect as hypothetical Article 27, assuming the reservation is not contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. 137 In my
view, such a reservation would rarely, if ever, be contrary to the object
and purpose of a treaty. 138 If another party does object to the reservation, then the treaty is not in force between the reserving and the objecting parties, 139 and the treaty would lack domestic legal force because
it lacks international force. If at least one other party fails to object, the
treaty would come into force subject to the reservation. The result would
be the existence of a Type A treaty obligation-binding and in force
under international law-that would lack the force of domestic law and
would accordingly not be binding on domestic law-applying officials, such
as judges.
If my analysis is correct, then treatymakers have the power to deprive
Type A treaties of domestic legal force, absent implementing legislation.
They can do this by making non-self-execution an unseverable part of the
United States' ratification of the treaty. If so, then the Supremacy Clause
in the end functions as a default rule. 140 It makes treaty provisions judicially enforceable, if valid and othenvise justiciable, unless the
treatymakers themselves affirmatively determine otherwise (and manifest
that intent in the constitutionally appropriate way). A strict textualist
might object that this construction is unfaithful to the Supremacy
Clause's text, which makes "all" treaties the law of the land. But the opposite conclusion, in my view, would require the rejection of too much
entrenched doctrine to be plausible. This critique, in any event, is unavailable to Professor Yoo, whose various alternative constructions of the
Constitution would represent far greater inroads onto the rule established by the Supremacy Clause's text.
137. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37.
138. Such a reservation does nothing more than establish for the United States the
rule that applies in other countries (such as the United Kingdom) by virtue of their
constitutions-i.e., that the treaty will not have the force of domestic law until legislatively
implemented. If such a provision were contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty, the
U.K. could never become a party to the treaty.
139. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 20, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 337.
140. Professor Yoo writes that, on his reading, "[t]he provision [of the Supremacy
Clanse] requiring state judges to enforce federal law creates a default rule that would be
triggered only if the political branches chose to enforce a treaty judicially, but had failed to
establish any lower courts." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1980. But a default rule is one
that does not need to be "triggered." Thus, insofar as he is arguing that a treaty always or
presumptively requires implementation by statute, he is reading the Supremacy Clause not
as the default rule, but as the opposite of a default rule. To the extent he is just saying that
he reads the "state judges" portion of the Supremacy Clause as a default rule because it
applies only if Congress fails to establish federal courts, his characterization is more
plausible, but still not accurate. State judges continue to have jurisdiction over treaty cases
even though Congress has created federal courts, and when they have jurisdiction, they are
required by the Supremacy Clause to enforce treaties as law.
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B. Yoo ~ Doctrinal Problem
Professor Yoo does not clearly espouse any particular rule concerning the domestic effect of treaties as an alternative to the prevailing view.
Instead, he argues that the founding material is consistent with any of a
number of possible alternative rules. In this section, I describe six alternative theories that Professor Yoo's article might be read to espouse, and
I explain why each is implausible in the light of text and doctrine.
1. First Theory: Treaties Neuer Have the Force of Domestic Law. - The
most radical position advanced by Professor Yoo is that all treaties require
implementing legislation. None is effective as domestic law unless and
until Congress enacts a statute giving it such force. (As discussed above,
this means that none have domestic force by virtue of the Constitution; if
and when an implementing statute is passed, the statute will have the
force of law. 141 ) The support for this position consists of statements that
Professor Yoo reads as indicating that the Founders regarded the
treatymaking power as distinct from the legislative power and gave the
treatymakers the former but not the latter.142
This position, however, is flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy
Clause's declaration that treaties do have the force of domestic law. It is
also contradicted decisively by the many, many cases in which the
Supreme Court has given effect to treaties even though they had not
been implemented by Congress. 143 This position also conflicts with such
entrenched doctrines as the last-in-time rule, under which treaties and
statutes are regarded as having equivalent stature and thus the last in
time prevails. Under Professor Yoo's theory, a treaty could never prevail
over a statute, as treaties would never have the force oflaw. Nor would it
make any sense even to say that a statute prevails over an earlier treaty. A
141. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
.
142. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1966-67, 1997, 2055. Professor Yoo also
argues that certain Framers regarded the making of domestic law as inherently legislative
and nondelegable, see supra note 20, but since he relies on the statements of the Founders
to this effect, I do not take him to be defending the rule described in the text on the
ground that the Founders could not have given treaties automatic domestic legal force
even if they had intended to do so. Cf. supra note 52. Instead, I take him to be relying on
evidence that some Framers regarded domestic lawmaking to be inherently legislative and
nondelegable as support for the argument that our Constitution should be construed that
way even though the Founders may have been wrong in thinking that this power could not
be delegated to the treatymakers in certain circumstances. See supra notes 20, 52
(considering Yoo's discussion of statements by Wilson and Johnson at the Philadelphia
convention).
143. See, e.g., El AI Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 119 S. Ct. 662, 668 (1999); Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 551 (1991); Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
122, 123-24 (1989); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989); Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
252 (1984); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 161 (1940); Santovincenzo v. Egan,
284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 609 (1927); Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Holden v.Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 247 (1872); United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 91 (1833).
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statute would prevail even over a later treaty. It would in fact never be
necessary to compare a statute and a treaty; statutes need be compared
only to each other (and to the Constitution). ProfessorYoo's theory is in
even greater conflict with the numerous decisions involving unimplemented treaties in which the Court has applied the principle that treaties
should be construed liberally. 144 In short, this position is plainly
untenable.
2. Second Theory: Treaties on Matters Within Article I Powers Never Have
the Force ofDomestic Law. - In the alternative, Professor Yoo advances the
argument that treaties lack the force of domestic law if they regulate a
matter falling within the scope of an Article I power. There are two possible versions of this position: The first would read the treatymaking power
as being constructively limited to matters not assigned to the legislature.
The second would concede that the treatymakers have the power to enter
into such treaties, but would interpret the Constitution as denying such
treaties domestic legal force until implemented.
In form, the basis for reconciling the first version of this position
with the Supremacy Clause's text is the same as the reason we regard
treaties that purport to appropriate money not to be effective as law. Because the treatymaking power would not extend to matters falling within
Article I, any treaty that does regulate such a matter lacks domestic legal
force because it is unconstitutional. But the two examples of claimed legislative exclusivity are so different in scope that they ultimately must be
regarded as different in kind. The conclusion that a treaty may not appropriate money is narrow and supported plausibly by Article l's specific
requirement that appropriations be "made by law" (meaning presumably
an Article I law). If everything falling within an Article I power were excluded from the treatymaking power, on the other hand, the latter power
would be reduced virtually to nothing. Recall that Article I gives the Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce, to define offenses against
the law of nations, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the federal government or any officer thereof, presumably including the powers of the
President in the area of foreign affairs. If treaties could not be made on
those subjects, it is difficult to imagine what treaties could be made. Indeed, a far more plausible case has been made that the federal government may not do by treaty anything that falls outside the powers of the
federal government as outlined in Article I. 145 Of course, if this argu144. See, e.g., Stuart, 489 U.S. at 368; Domenech, 311 U.S. at 163; Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielson v.Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929);
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342 (1924); Tucker v.
Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
487 (1879); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 241, 249 (1830).
145. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 390 (1998).
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ment and Yoo's were accepted, the treatymaking power would be a null
set. Although I do not agree that the treatymaking power encompasses
only matters that fall within Article I, 146 the argument is plausible at all
only because most treaties throughout our history have involved matters
that plausibly fall within Article I. This, in turn, shows that the position
Professor Yoo attributes to the Federal Farmer is not only unsupported by
constitutional text, which places no such limits on the treatymaking
power, but also has been decisively rejected by history and tradition. Numerous Supreme Court and lower court decisions give effect to treaties
on matters within Article I powers.147
Professor Yoo might well respond that he is not claiming that the
treatymakers were thought to lack the power to conclude treaties on such
matters, but only that any such treaties were thought to lack domestic
legal force unless and until implemented by Congress. But this argument
would present a direct conflict with the Supremacy Clause's text. If the
treaty were regarded as being within the treatymaking power, then under
the Supremacy Clause it would be "the law of the land." If Professor
Yoo's claim that it nevertheless requires legislative implementation were
correct, then the treaties would not appear to be "law" in any recognizable sense. By his own accounting, such treaties would not even bind Congress to pass the called-for legislation.148 Congress would retain the discretion to enact implementing legislation or not, just as it would if the
Supremacy Clause had made no mention of treaties. 1 4 9 There is no support in doctrine for this reading out of the Supremacy Clause. Numerous
cases enforce treaties on matters within Article I in the absence of implementing legislation.l5o
146. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1317, 1336-43 (1999) (discussing the scope of the Treaty Power) [hereinafter
Vazquez, Treaty Power].
147. See, e.g., Tseng, 119 S. Ct. at 668 (Warsaw Convention); Royd, 499 U.S. at 533-34
(same); Chan, 490 U.S. at 123-25 (same); Stuart, 489 U.S. at 366 (Convention Respecting
Double Taxation); Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 (Warsaw Convention); Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at
252 (same); Domenech, 311 U.S. at 161 (Pan American Trademark Treaty); Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (1924 Treaty with Great Britain); Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at
• 40 (Consular Convention with Italy); Ford, 273 U.S. at 618 (1924 Treaty with Great Britain);
Holden, 84 U.S. at 247 (Treaty of Dec. 29, 1835); Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d
1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (Warsaw Convention); Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d
647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Convention Respecting Double Taxation); Blanco v. United
States, 775 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (Treaty of Honduras); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d
1055, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Panama Canal Treaty); Smith v. Canadian Pacific Ainvays,
Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (Warsaw Convention); Vanity Fair Mills v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1956) (Convention for Fair Protection of
Industrial Property); Master of County v. Cribben & Sexton Co., 202 F.2d 779, 783
(C.C.P.A. 1953) (same); American Express Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cust. App. 146, 161
(Ct. Cust. App. 1913) (Treaty with Canada).
148. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979.
149. See supra notes 70, 72 and accompanying text (discussing Necessary and Proper
Clause).
150. See cases cited supra note 147.
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3. Third Theory: The Constitution Establishes a Presumption That Treaties
Are Not the Law of the Land. - Perhaps in recognition of the array of cases
that contradict the categorical rules he proffers, Professor Yoo advances
in the alternative the claim that our Constitution should be read to embrace a presumption that treaties lack the force of domestic law unless
and until implemented by Congress. lSI
As noted above, this reading has the virtue of not reading the
Supremacy Clause entirely out of the Constitution, as the clause would
function as the source of the treatymakers' power to give the treaties they
make the force of domestic law. Nevertheless, it is in conflict ·with the
clause's text, as the provision is not written as a power-conferring provision. It would presume that a Type A treaty establishes a Type B law,
whereas the Supremacy Clause declares Type A treaties to be themselves
law.
This interpretation is also unsupported by Professor Yoo's historical
narrative. The burden of his discussion of the British practice is that the
requirement that treaties be implemented by Parliament reflected the desire to safeguard the prerogatives of the representative branch against
executive overreaching. 152 The burden of his discussion of the debates at
the framing and the ratifying conventions was similarly the need to protect the role of the House from overreaching by the President and Senate.153 It is understandable why delegates who had this concern would
propose to give the House a necessary role in the making or even the
implementation of treaties. 154 But it seems certain that such delegates
would be entirely unsatisfied by a rule that would give the House such a
role only if the President and Senate wanted them to have it (or forgot to
address the matter). A rule that leaves it to the other branches to determine whether the House will have a role fits poorly with Professor Yoo's
story about the perceived need to protect the people and their representatives from overreaching by the less representative branches.
Professor Yoo argues that a presumption against self-execution is
supported by Foster. His treatment of this case, however, is a textbook
example of how, with just a little strategic cutting and pasting, a text may
be made to appear to stand for the opposite of what it says. Marshall
wrote in Foster as follows:
•
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to
be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of
the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States, a
151. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2092.
152. See id. at 1997-2004.
153. See id. at 2024-26.
154. As Professor Flaherty has shown, however, these proposals largely took the form
of suggested amendments, thus implying that the unamended Constitution did not give
the House such a role. See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 2123.
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different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. 155
The first part of that passage is obviously referring to the effect of treaties
under international law or in countries such as Great Britain that do not
regard treaties as having the force of law. The second part plainly states
that the Supremacy Clause rejects that rule and "establishe[s]" a "different
principle" in the United States.
In an attempt to portray Foster as embracing a presumption that treaties do not generally have effect as domestic law, Professor Yoo inverts the
order of Marshall's sentences. Professor Yoo writes as follows:
In Foster, Marshall acknowledged that the Supremacy Clause suggested that all treaties were to be considered self-executing because it "declares a treaty to be the law of the land." A treaty's
status as supreme federal law required that the courts regard the
international agreement "as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision." According to Marshall, however, "a treaty is, in
its nature, a contract between t\vo nations, not a legislative act."
As a result, a treaty does not achieve, by its own operation, "the
object to be accomplished," but instead "is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument. " 156
Inverting the order allows him to portray Marshall as suggesting that the
British rule is an exception to the Supremacy Clause, whereas what Marshall plainly says is that the Supremacy Clause was an alteration of the
British rule. Of course, if the British rule were an exception to the
Supremacy Clause, the Supremacy Clause would mean nothing, as under
the British rule treaties are not regarded as law. 157
To be sure, Marshall does say that only a treaty that "operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision" is equivalent to an -act of the
legislature. But this language cannot have been meant as a reference to
his earlier statement that a treaty "in its nature" is a contract that "does
not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished." The latter
language came immediately before the statement that "[i]n the United
States, a different principle is established" by the Supremacy Clause. This
has to mean that the rule established by the Supremacy Clause is not a
rule under which treaties "generally" do not effect of themselves the ob155. Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.} 253, 314 (1829).
156. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2087 (footnotes omitted}.
157. Justice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796}, is
similarly unrecognizable from Yoo's description of it. I discuss the opinion, which Yoo
regards as the strongest evidence for the "internationalist" position, see Yoo, Globalism,
supra note 1, at 1981, in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1110-13.
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ject to be accomplished. Foster thus strongly supports a presumption that
treaties are self-executing in the United States.
When Marshall turned to the treaty before him, he seemed to lose
sight of this presumption. As I have noted, Marshall's application of the
"different principle" to the treaty·before him might be read to suggest a
purer interpretive enterprise, uninfluenced by a presumption either for
or against self-execution. 158 But, I argued, the Court's need to reverse
itself on this issue in Percheman, and the Court's language in the latter
case, more than compensate for Marshall's apparent failure to heed his
own counsel in Foster. In particular, the Court framed the issue in
Percheman as whether the treaty "stipulat[es] for some future legislative
act. "159 To "stipulate" for something is "to include [it] speci.ficaUy in the
terms of an agreement, contract, etc.; to arrange definitively. "160 Thus, if
a non-self-executing treaty is one that stipulates for a future legislative act,
it is one that provides specifically that such acts are contemplated. In addition to the "different principle" language in Foster and the "stipulate" language in Percheman, a presumption of self-execution is supported by the
fact that Foster itself remains the sole case in which the Supreme Court
has unambiguously denied relief on the ground that the treaty was not
self-executing. 161 In the overwhelming m~ority of treaty cases, the
Supreme Court has reached the merits without even discussing whether
the treaty was or was not self-executing.162
Even if Foster did contain language that supported a presumption
against self-execution, dictum163 in a single Supreme Court decision that
158. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 702 n.36. This is far from saying,
however, that treaties can be enforced in the courts only if they "are specifically directed"
to the judiciary or if the text "clearly indicates judicial enforcement." Yoo, Globalism,
supra note 1, at 2089, 2091. The opinion says nothing even remotely resembling that.
159. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
160. Webster's New Twentieth Century Unabridged Dictionary 1790 (2d eel. 1983)
(emphasis added) (first definition) (The second definition is "to specify as an essential
condition of or requisite in an agreement."). On the term's denotation of specificity, see
also, e.g., Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility 6 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1955) (1811) ("He did
not stipulate for any particular sum, my dear Fanny; he only requested me, in general
terms, to assist them.").
161. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 716 & n.96.
162. See id. at 716 n.99.
163. This is Yoo's characterization. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2088. I have
characterized it as an alternative holding. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at
700 n.27, 702 n.35. Professor Yoo criticizes me for "missing" the assertedly "significant"
connection betlveen the Court's first alternative holding in Foster and its self-execution
holding. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2088. I did not see a connection earlier, see
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 702 n.35, and I still do not see one. It is in the
nature of alternative holdings that each assumes the incorrectness of the other. The
"connection" Professor Yoo apparently sees is in fact merely a parallel: Both holdings, in
Professor Yoo's view, reflect deference to the political branches in foreign affairs. But,
contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion, the Court in Foster does not suggest that the courts
are to defer to the Executive's interpretation of treaties that are the law of the land. See
infra p. 2202. Even if the court had articulated a rule of deference to the Executive in
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was subsequently overruled would be a thin reed on which to rest a rule
as incompatible with the Supremacy Clause's text as the one Professor
Yoo advances. 164 The dictum would be more than offset by the text of
the Constitution, which, as discussed above, independently supports a
presumption of self-execution. But, in fact, Foster (in light of Percheman)
strongly supports a presumption of self-execution.
4. Remaining Theories: No Treaty Is Self-Executing; No Treaty That Falls
Within an Article I Power Is Self-Executing; The Constitution Establishes a Presumption That Treaties Are Non-Self-Executing. - The remaining theories
parallel the first three, except they substitute the term "self-executing" for
"law of the land." 165 To the extent that ProfessorYoo understands "nonself-executing" to mean "not domestic law," the last three theories are the
same as the first three and must be rejected for the reasons discussed
above. But Professor Yoo's apparent approval of the cases that equate the
self-execution question with the private right of action question intreaty interpretation, it is hard to see the relevance of this to the self-execution issue. The
Court does hold that, when a treaty promises legislation, it is addressed to the legislature.
Beyond this, the decision tells us nothing about the allocation of powers among the
branches. It certainly does not hold that any "types" of treaty provisions necessarily require
implementation other than those that by their terms stipulate for legislation. See Yoo,
Globalism, supra note 1, at 2089.
164. Professor Yoo relies in addition on language from the Head Money Cases and
lWiitrnry v. IWbinson that indicates, in his view, that treaties "were generally not self,.
executing." Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1970. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). But the language from
these cases that he reads as suggesting that treaties generally are not self-executing only
makes the obvious point that domestic courts will not get involved in international claims
between states regarding treaty violations-i.e., claims at the international plane, rather
than domestic cases that raise international issues. These cases do not say, as Professor Yoo
suggests, that the courts must defer to the political branches in cases involving treaties.
They only go so far as to recognize that the courts must respect a decision to violate a treaty
made by particular combinations of the political branches-i.e., a majority of both Houses
of Congress plus the President or a supermajority of both Houses without the President.
See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599. As noted, had these courts embraced
Professor Yoo's position that all treaties are non-self-executing, there would have been no
need to articulate or rely on a last-in-time rule. Professor Yoo claims that these cases
"linked self-execution to the specific creation of individual rights." Yoo, Globalism, supra
note 1, at 1971. But the concept of specificity makes no appearance in any of these cases,
but appears to have been interpolated by Professor Yoo. The cases do suggest that the
courts' role is to enforce individual rights created by treaty. This raises but does not help
answer the question of when a treaty creates individual rights. In the Head Money Cases, the
Court indicated that treaties may be enforced by individuals when they prescribe a rule
from which the rights of individuals may be determined. See 112 U.S. at 598. As I have
noted, this appears to reflect the requirement that treaty provisions be mandatory and
sufficiently determinate that courts can give them effect without difficulty. I discuss the
issue more generally in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1123-25, 1128-33.
Suffice it to say that Professor Yoo reads far more into the dicta in these cases about selfexecution than their text will bear.
165. Professor Yoo does not advance these last three as separate from the first three
theories, but I discuss them separately because there are a few statements in his article that
contradict his position that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic law.
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troduces an ambiguity. 166 If a treaty that is not self-executing is merely
one that fails to confer a private right of action, then a categorical rule
that all treaties (or treaties falling within Article I) are non-self-executing
would mean that such treaties could still be invoked in court as a defense
or pursuant to rights of action having their source in other laws, such as
section 1983, the APA, or the common law.167 A presumption that treaties are non-self-executing, on this view, would apparently allow such treaties to serve as a defense or to be enforced pursuant to other laws conferring rights of action, even if the presumption were not overcome.
Overcoming the presumption would be necessary only if there were a
need to rely on the treaty for the right of action. Moreover, overcoming
the presumption would require unambiguous evidence that the treatymakers intended to create a private right of action, but not evidence that
they intended the treaty to be effective as domestic law. 168
That this is what Professor Yoo has in mind is suggested by his discussion of Ware v. Hylton, in which he finds, "contrary to internationalist
claims," that Article IV of the treaty "did not actually give British plaintiffs
a cause of action to sue in federal court," but, rather, "only preempted a
defense created by state law," the "cause of action [arising] under state
common law."169 If Professor Yoo means that, for this reason, the Court
found the treaty to be non-self-executing, he seems to be saying that a
non-self-executing treaty can still be relied on in court as a defense or
pursuant to rights of action having their source outside the treaty. That
this is his position is also suggested by his reference to the case law concerning implication of private rights of action under statutes as an analogous doctrine that addresses whether statutes are "self-executing."l70 Of
course, the doctrine reflected in that line of cases is not relevant when a

166. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972 & n.75.
167. In addition, the lack of a private right of action would not prevent the treaty
from being enforced in court at the behest of the executive branch, the states or state
officials, or even foreign states or their officials. But cf. Brief for Amicus Curiae United
States at 11-12, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770) (arguing that
federal district courts should not try claims of treaty violations brought by foreign
governments seeking to overturn otherwise valid criminal proceedings in U.S. courts). Of
course, such treaties could not be enforced in court even at the behest of these entities if
they lacked the force of domestic law.
168. Thus a treaty like the Warsaw Convention or the Torture Convention would be
self-executing. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019-20, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
(creating right of action for certain injuries during international transportation);
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 (creating right of action for damages caused by torture).
169. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2080.
170. ld. at 1972.
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party relies on a statute as a defense or when he can base his right of
action on another statute, such as section 1983.1 71
On the other hand, this position is inconsistent with the position he
takes elsewhere that non-self-executing treaties lack the effect of domestic
law.I 7 2 Perhaps he means to adopt the "private right of action" theory for
purposes of determining what has to be unambiguously stated to overcome the presumption against self-execution, but the "not effective as domestic law" theory for purposes of determining the effect of a non-selfexecuting treaty.I 7 3 The result would be that a treaty that does not unambiguously create a private right of action would be non-self-executing,
and as a result it could not be enforced in court even as a defense. Such a
rule verges on the incoherent, however. Why should the failure to make
a clear statement about the existence of a private right of action have a
bearing on the treaty's enforceability as a defense?
If Professor Yoo's position is simply that a treaty presumptively does
not create a private right of action, but may still be enforced as a defense
or pursuant to other statutes or the common law, then his theory is far
less significant than the sweeping statements in his article suggest. In addition to being enforceable as defenses, the obligations of state and federal officials could be enforced through generic rights of action such as
those codified in Section 1983 (for state officials), the APA (for federal
171. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24
(1987); Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1146-47.
172. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1961. The attempt to understand Professor
Yoo's understanding of the concept of non-self-execution is further complicated by his
discussion ofjustice Iredell's opinion in Ware v. Hylton and the subsequent negotiation of
the Jay Treaty. Professor Yoo suggests that Iredell's opinion stood for the proposition that
the 1783 treaty was non-self-executing. See id. at 2078. But Iredell merely interpreted the
treaty not to apply to debts that had already been discharged by the time of the treaty's
application. The disagreement between Iredell and the majority in Ware was thus about
what the treaty required on the merits, not whether it was operative as law without prior
implementation, or whether it conferred a cause of action, or about anything that might
plausibly be regarded as a self-execution issue. Professor Yoo also suggests that john jay's
agreement with the British to establish an international tribunal for the resolution of
certain disputes is somehow inconsistent with the prevailing view or with the concept of
self-execution. It is not. Indeed, a self-executing treaty could facilitate such a regime by
requiring courts to dismiss suits that under the treaty are subject to compulsory arbitration
or to enforce the decisions of such a tribunal. Cf. United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 3. On the other hand, regarding such a treaty as non-self-executing would
hamper such a regime, as the treaty could not be the basis for a domestic court's decision
to compel arbitration.
173. That he would find a treaty to be self-executing only if it clearly states that it
creates a private right of action is suggested by his discussion of Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at
1972-73. Elsewhere he says that a treaty that is non-self-executing does not have the force
of domestic law. See id. at 1958-59. That he would combine the t\Vo theories in the
manner suggested in the text is less clear, but implied by his statement that the "private
right of action" analysis is a refinement of the intent-based analysis. ld. at 1972-73. (This
combination of the t\Vo would conflict with his treatment of Ware, however.)
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officials), and the habeas corpus statute (for both). 174 If the legislature
were to repeal those statutes, substantial constitutional questions would
arise under the due process clause (and, I would argue, the Supremacy
Clause), but that contingency is a topic for another day. 175 Because of
these statutory provisions providing rights of action against government,
the need to find a right of action in the treaty should arise primarily
where an individual seeks to enforce a treaty against another individual
(or a foreign state). Here, Professor Yoo urges a rule analogous to the
stringent one the Court has adopted for the purpose of determining
whether a statute creates an implied right of action. 176 In another article,
I explain why the standard for implying private rights of action under
treaties should be more lenient. 177 Further discussion of this question,
however, would take me too far afield. The very fact that the effect of
adopting the "private right of action" interpretation would be modest is a
strong indication that this is not what Professor Yoo has in mind. Modest
change seems inconsistent with the article's tone and with its sweeping
statements about the separation of powers, to which 1 shall now tum. 17B
174. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994); 5 u.s.c. § 702 (1994); 28 u.s.c. § 2241 (1994).
175. I discuss the issue in Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1150-51 &
n.288.
176. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1977.
177. See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1157-62.
178. ProfessorYoo's critique of my position in his Rejoinder is based on a complete
misapprehension of my position. Yoo claims that I take the "unsparing" position that all
treaties are self-executing and hence immediately judicially enforceable. Yoo, Treaties and
Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2254. To the contrary, the thesis of one of my prior
articles was that there are not one but "four grounds on which a court might legitimately
conclude that legislative action is necessary to authorize it to enforce a treaty,
notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause." Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 696.
See also supra Part ill.A.1 (summarizing those four distinct types of reasons that can
support the conclusion that a treaty is non-self-executing). Yoo says that my position that
treaties are always judicially enforceable is implausible because even the other categories of
laws mentioned in the Supremacy Clause are not always judicially enforceable. See Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2220. In fact, I have argued that the
categories of non-self-executing treaties correspond generally to the reasons constitutional
and statutory norms are sometimes found to be judicially unenforceable. My claim is that
the Supremacy Clause declares the three types of norms to have the status of "Law of the
Land," and hence the three should be judicially enforceable in at least roughly the same
circumstances. See generally Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8. It is Yoo who seeks to
treat treaties radically differently from the other two sorts of federal law mentioned in the
Supremacy Clause.
Yoo would have been closer to the mark had he contended that I take the position
that all treaties have the force of domestic law. This position differs from the one Yoo
attributes to me in that it recognizes that a norm may be said to have the force of domestic
law even though it is not judicially enforceable. The position that all treaties have the force
of domestic law derives strong support from the text of the Constitution, which provides
that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Nevertheless, my position is not in the end that
simple. (Unlike Professor Yoo, however, I regard the complexities I am about to describe
as a point against my thesis. I regard simplicity in legal doctrine as desirable, and in
particular I regard complexities that deviate from a text as problematic. Nevertheless, 1
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Professor Yoo relies as well on "deeper structural imperatives, arising
from federalism and the separation of powers, that the Constitution imposes upon treaties"-imperatives that he accuses defenders of the prevailing view of ignoring.l79 Presumably, he is referring here to the sweeping arguments he has made throughout the article calling to mind the
political question doctrine. Treaties should not be enforced in courts, he
argues, because they implicate foreign policy, and the conduct of foreign
policy is allocated by our Constitution to the political branches. 18° Finding a treaty to be self-executing "robs the President and Congress of the
flexibility they might need in conducting the nation's foreigu affairs,"l81
meaning the flexibility to violate treaty commitments. At the abstract
level in which they most often appear in the article, these "structural imperatives" are too indeterminate to be of any help in answering the questions at issue. Professor Yoo's periodic attempts to derive from the cases
more specific structural principles that support his position on the nonself-execution of treaties, on the other hand, are wholly unpersuasive.
I readily endorse the statement that our Constitution allocates the
conduct of foreign policy to the political branches, but the statement is
no more helpful at answering the tough questions than any other tautology. Equally unassailable is the statement that enforcement of the law
accept the complexities described below because of the need to accommodate judicial
doctrine.) First, I recognize that treaties that go beyond the treat:ymaking power lack the
force of domestic law. Second, and more controversially, I accept that the _treat:ymakers
have the power to enter into an international treaty obligation towards individuals but
deny it the force of domestic law by attaching to it a "no-domestic-effect" reservation.
Unlike Yoo, I do not regard the question of the validity of such reservations to be easy, but
I ultimately accept the practice's constitutionality because I cannot find a stable and
principled distinction between such reservations and what the Court upheld in Foster. Yoo
criticizes me for abandoning the purity of my literal interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause by reducing the clause to a mere presumption, but this criticism is ironic because:
(a) Yoo had earlier criticized my literal interpretation as simplistic, and (b) Yoo makes
exactly the same move when he discovers that what he regards as the correct interpretation
of the Constitution is untenable in light of entrenched judicial doctrine.
Even though much of my prior writing on this subject has sought to reconcile the
categories of non-self-executing treaties with the status of such treaties as domestic law by
pointing to circumstances in which the other forms of domestic law have been found to be
judicially unenforceable, I do not "take [Yoo] to task for equating whether a treaty is a law
of the land, and therefore domestic law, with whether a treaty is enforceable in court."Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.l19. In fact, I am quite
sympathetic to the claim that the status of a norm as domestic law entails the norm's
enforceability in court against those on whom it imposes a duty, by those for whose benefit
it imposes the duty is not a legal norm. My effort has been to show that treaties have
generally been held non-self-executing for reasons that are either consistent with this
principle or fall within narrow exceptions to it. I thus largely agree with his statements in
"Globalism" that, under his theory, non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic
law. This is indeed the basis of my textual critique of his position.
179. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1982.
180. See id. at 1979.
181. Id.
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has been allocated to the legal branches (including the courts). The
Constitution may be said to require that foreign policy be conducted
within the bounds established by the law. In other words, when a matter
is governed by law, it is outside the realm of mere "policy," whether foreign or domestic. Thus, the political branches may not infringe constitutional rights even when doing so would advance foreign policy goals. 182
Similarly, foreign policy must be conducted in accordance with statutes
that regulate foreign commerce.xss Like the Constitution and federal
statutes, treaties are declared by the Supremacy Clause to be law. Thus,
the Constitution may well require that those responsible for conducting
foreign policy do so in accordance with applicable treaties. The truism
that our Constitution allocates the conduct of foreign policy to the political branches does not help us answer that question.
Moreover, the doctrine of self-executing treaties "robs" the political
branches of their flexibility only if we independently establish that the
Constitution entitles those branches to more flexibility than the doctrine
gives them. Even without a presumption against self-execution, the political branches retain a great deal of flexibility to violate treaties. A mcyority of both Houses plus the President may do so by passing a statute that
conflicts with the treaty.IS 4 The President and the Senate may do so by
concluding a later inconsistent treaty with another nation. Iss They may
do so without the agreement of another nation by abrogating the
treaty.IS 6 More controversially, they may even attach a reservation making it clear that the treaty is not judicially enforceable.IS7 In certain circumstances, at least, the President acting alone may abrogate a treaty. 188
Even when the President lacks the power to abrogate a treaty alone, the
courts apparently will not interfere with his "flexibility" to do so. 189 The
conclusion that a treaty is self-executing admittedly precludes lower-level
182. See, e.g., Boos v. Bany, 485 U.S. 312, 323-24 (1988) (holding D.C. code in
violation of the First Amendment despite its enactment for reasons of foreign policy).
183. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that presidential power is at its weakest in areas where
Congress has affirmatively acted).
184. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that when a statute
conflicts with a provision of a treaty, the latter in time will prevail); Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (same).
185. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 443-45 (1975) (holding
that treaty concluded in 1889 terminated 1867 treaty between Indian tribe and the United
States).
186. See VanDer Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S. 114, 116-18 (1936) (holding
that United States' termination of a treaty provision prevents the provision from being
relied on in U.S. courts).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 136-140.
188. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that when engaged in the recognition or derecognition of a country, the President
may, as an incident of executive power, abrogate a treaty).
189. See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that whether a
treaty has been properly terminated is a political question). But cf. id. at 998 (Powell,J.,
concurring) (stating that question may be justiciable in certain circumstances).
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executive officials, and perhaps the President as well, from violating a
treaty that has not been validly (or perhaps even invalidly) terminated.
Such officials may wish to have the flexibility to violate treaties that have
not been terminated or declared non-self-executing, but Professor Yoo
has not shown why our Constitution is best interpreted to provide such
flexibility. Flexibility has its benefits, but so does precommitment. The
decision to have a constitution that limits as well as grants powers and
which, among other things, gives treaties the status oflaw, reflects a rejection of unlimited flexibility in favor of precommitment.
Furthermore, the proposed presumption against self-execution may
actually hobble the political branches in their conduct of foreign policy.
Recall that a non-self-executing treaty is not judicially enforceable even
against the states. If Professor Yoo's presumption were adopted, a treaty
would be enforceable in court against the states, even at the behest of the
federal government, only if the treatymakers made it clear that they intended it to be. The political branches may not welcome the burden Professor Yoo would place on them or the consequences of failing to overcome the presumption. The presumption Professor Yoo advocates would
give the states a greater opportunity to block an attempt to give the treaty
domestic legal force, quite possibly to the ultimate detriment of our foreign policy. This result may be defensible on federalism grounds, but
Professor Yoo has not rested his argument on federalism principles.190
Professor Yoo is no more successful at deriving more specific and
determinate separation-o£.powers principles from the cases. For example, he cites Foster for the principle that the judiciary's role is limited to
"'decid[ing] upon individual rights, according to those principles which
the political departments of the nation have established.'" 191 But this
does not tell us, as Professor Yoo suggests, that the courts have "no special
role" in the enforcement of treaties.l 92 On the contrary, the "'principles
which the political departments of the nation have established'" would
190. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2091-94. Professor Yoo's exclusive focus on
horizontal separation of powers suggests that he might permit even non-self-executing
treaties to be enforced in court against states, at least at the behest of the federal
government. But this would be inconsistent with his recognition that non-self-executing
treaties lack domestic legal force. State law cannot be preempted by federal norms lacking
the force of law. Perhaps he would construe a non-self-executing treaty as a delegation of
lawmaking power to the Executive Branch. This would solve some of the problems just
noted, as it would allow the Executive Branch to issue a regulation implementing the
treaty. Inconsistent state laws would be preempted by the regulation, and their
enforcement could be enjoined by a court at the behest of the federal government. There
is little doubt that a treaty could delegate lawmaking power to the Executive in this way,
but Professor Yoo has not explained the basis for construing treaties to delegate lawmaking
power to the Executive even when they are silent on the issue. Indeed, it is not clear that
Professor Yoo would approve of such a presumption, as it would not offer what he sees as
the principal benefit of the presumption he advocates-the preservation of a role for the
most representative of the branches, the House.
191. ld. at 2088 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829)).
192. ld. at 1965.
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appear to include treaties made by the President and the Senate. 193 Professor Yoo has given us no reason to conclude otherwise. Professor Yoo
also appears to interpret the statement that the courts are to get involved
only where the treaty involves "individual rights" as somehow "ensur[ing]
that the political branches ... retain the power to choose how or whether
to implement the nation's international obligations."194 He draws a false
dichotomy. If a treaty creates individual rights, the courts have a role in
enforcing them. This does not negate the power of the political branches
to break the treaty by passing a statute or abrogating the treaty, but the
existence of this power does not imply that the enforcement of a treaty
that has not been terminated or superseded is entirely in the hands of the
political branches.
The principle for which Professor Yoo cites Foster does help explain
why the courts were required to defer to the President's interpretation of
the treaty at issue in that part of the opinion, an 1803 treaty between
Spain and France (thus not one made by the political departments of the
United States). But, for the same reason, the fact that the Court found it
appropriate to defer to the Executive's interpretation of such a treaty tells
us little about the need for judicial deference to the Executive with respect to treaties that are the law of the land. 195
Similarly, Professor Yoo cites the Head Money Cases and Whitney v.
Robinson for the general proposition that "the political branches are to
enforce treaties, break treaties, or to seek remedies for their violation,"
but "the courts generally are to restrain themselves from entering the
area" oftreatyviolations. 196 But the broad language from those opinions
that Professor Yoo relies on establishes only that the courts have no role
to play in resolving disputes between nations at the international plane.
When it comes to resolving disputes about alleged treaty violations at the
domestic plane, the Court merely holds that the courts must defer to a
decision to break a treaty made by specific combinations of the political
branches: a mcyority of both Houses plus the President, or a
supermajority of both Houses without the President. The Court, in other
words, merely applied the last-in-time rule. That the political branches
may bind the courts by passing a statute does not mean that they can do
so without passing a statute. Professor Yoo has read far greater limita193. Id. at 2088 (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. at 307).
194. Id. at 2089.
195. If the courts were required to defer to the Executive's interpretation of U.S.
treaties, those who were litigating against the Executive in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (refugee challenge to Executive's interpretation of treaty),
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (challenge by criminal defendant of
Executive's interpretation of extradition treaty), and in many other cases, could have been
quickly dispatched. Instead, their arguments were considered on their merits without any
mention of deference.
196. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1970. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
195 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-600 (1884).
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tions on the courts into these and other cases than their language will
bear.197
CONCLUSION: ON UNSE'ITLING THE SETILED

As Professor Flaherty notes at the start of his Response, Professor Yoo
is now among the ranks of a small group of scholars who have embarked
on the project of unsettling what had previously been thought to be setded in the area of foreign affairs law. This entire project is in my view
vulnerable to a powerful threshold objection: It undermines one of the
central reasons for having law-its setdement function. The dictum that
it is often more important that something be setded than that it be setded
right198 is as applicable to constitutional law as to other forms oflaw.199
The setdement function is reflected most prominendy in the doctrine of
stare decisis, and even the greatest judicial defenders of the importance
of text and original intent in constitutional adjudication admit that they
do not always prevail over judicial precedent.20o
The fact that a point of law is setded is thus by itself a reason not to
unsetde it. This does not mean, of course, that there can be no sound
reasons for unsetding the setded. Clearly there were sound reasons for
197. Another example of overread.ing is Professor Yoo's interpretation of Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). He cites that case as
establishing the proposition that the Supreme Court has now adopted the "private right of
action" view of the non-self-execution doctrine. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1972-73.
Amerada Hess involved the question whether, by becoming a party to certain treaties,
Argentina had waived its sovereign immunity. The treaties said nothing about sovereign
immunity. The Court held that the treaties did not withdraw Argentina's immunity
because they "only set forth substantive rules of conduct and state that compensation shall
be paid for certain wrongs. They do not create private rights of action for foreign
corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in United States courts."
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442 (footnote omitted). This statement has no implications for
the self-execution issue. It merely recognizes that a treaty that does not address the
amenability to suit of a foreign state in U.S. courts does not remove such a state's
immunity. For the proposition that the Court now equates the self-execution issue with the
private right of action issue, Professor Yoo relies on the Court's "telling" citation of Fosterv.
Neilson and the Head Money Cases after the statement quoted above. Why the Court cited
these cases for the proposition is admittedly mysterious. But to draw the conclusions from
it that Professor Yoo draws is a stretch, to say the least. Perhaps ChiefJustice Rehnquist or
his clerk meant what Professor Yoo says when they inserted the "cf." cite to Foster and the
Head Money Cases, but it seems unreasonable to attribute such a position to the Court as a
whole.
198. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
199. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1371 & n.48 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The
Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1997).
200. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, William Howard Taft
Constitntional Law Lecture at the U. ofCin. (Sept. 16, 1988), in 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861
(1989) ("[A]Imost every originalist would adulterate [originalism] with the doctrine of
stare decisis • • • •") •
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unsettling what was settled by Scott v. Sandford'2° 1 or Plessy v. Ferguson.2°2
But those who propose to unsettle the settled bear a high threshold burden of persuasion-and the strongest reasons for jettisoning a settled
rule would appear to be those based on morality and justice.2°3 Professor
Yoo invokes democracy, but the very decision to have a constitution that
places limits on m~orities is inconsistent with a pure form of democracy,
and the most desirable impure form of democracy is the subject of too
much disagreement to justify the rejection of a consensus on a point such
as the one under discussion here. At any rate, ProfessorYoo has not offered any robust theory of democracy, let alone one that warrants the
rejection of the prevailing view.
Professors Curtis A Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have devoted considerable effort to attempt to unsettle the principle that, under our Constitution, customary international law is federallaw.2° 4 They note with
some force that the consensus on this issue appears to have been produced by anachronistically reading pre-Erie claims that customary international law is part of our law to mean that customary international law is
federal law in a post-Erie sense. But the fact that a settled point began in
error is not a reason to reject it. The same sort of criticism could be
leveled at the decisions that originally adopted the last-in-time rule, 205 yet
we do not see many calls for its rejection, 2°6 least of all from these scholars. Indeed, the very point of the doctrine of stare decisis is to require
courts to follow precedents without inquiring into their correctness. The

201. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
202. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
203. If, as discussed earlier, entrenched precedent prevails over arguments based on
text and history, it can be overcome only by bringing strong arguments based on justice
and morality into the mix.
204. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997).
205. See Whitneyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888); Taylorv. Morton, 23 F. Cas.
784, 786 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799). These decisions reasoned that treaties and
statutes have equivalent status because the Supremacy Clause makes no distinction
between them. However, the Supremacy Clause similarly makes no distinction between
the Constitution and those two other forms of federal law, yet we have no difficulty saying
that the Constitution controls the other two. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 853, 867 & n.67, 869 & n.72 (1987).
206. But see Henkin, supra note 205, at 886 (arguing that "the power to derogate"
from international law should be "strictly limited"); Louis Henkin, Treaties in a
Constitutional Democracy, 10 Micb.J. Int'l L. 406, 425-26 (1989) (arguing that the last-intime rule reflects a misunderstanding of Article VI); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 Va. L.
Rev. 1071, 1110 (1985) (arguing that the historical basis for the last-in-time rule suggests its
limitation). I have made it clear that I accept the last-in-time rule because it is entrenched.
See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 696 n.9; Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra
note 8, at 1114 n.126.
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doctrine has bite only when it causes a court to follow a precedent that it
regards as wrong. 207
Perhaps Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, and Yoo would defend their
project on the ground that their whole point is that these areas are not
properly governed by law at all. The fact that unsettling it undermines
the point of law is not an objection if their point is that law properly has
no role to play here. That this is Professor Yoo's position is suggested by
his description of a scenario of which he apparently approves:
Rather than imposing a fixed rule of self-execution, the Constitution may allow the House and Senate to use their constitutional and political powers over legislation and funding to prevent direct treaty implementation. Congress may use its powers
in specific cases to establish the broad principle that any treaty
that infringes upon the scope of the domestic legislative power
must be implemented by legislation, or it can use its powers on a
case-by-case basis to ensure that it plays a central role in treaty
implementation. After this process of cooperation or struggle,
the branches may even arrive at a rule of complete non-self-execution, depending on historical and international circumstances, the relative power of the branches, and the people's
wishes. 208
The picture Professor Yoo paints here of a process of struggle among
the branches and a possible resolution based on "relative power" is, of
course, the very opposite of the rule of law. Although Professor Yoo
clearly welcomes such a process of struggle, he tells us little about why it
would be a good thing. The Founders experienced considerable struggle
during the critical period attempting to get the states to comply with
treaty obligations, but they did not look back on that experience with
equanimity. They regarded it as a problem, and they addressed it by declaring treaties to be supreme law. And-unlike the Continental Congress,
which passed a resolution declaring treaties to be the law of the land
(something that Professor Yoo appears to envision as one of the possible
outcomes of this struggle)-the Founders enshrined this declaration in a
constitution, which they in turn also declared to be supreme law. This was
quite obviously an attempt to settle the issue by (partially) removing
treaty compliance from the realm of politics.
Of course, enshrining a decision in the Constitution cannot by itself
settle the point. For any attempted settlement to succeed, it has to be
accepted by those exercising power, which means ultimately by the people. The success of the settlement attempted by our Framers required
207. Moreover, even if the principle that customary international law is federal law
did originate in error, it has since been ratified for more persuasive reasons. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (relying on Phillip C. Jessup, The
Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Thompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L.
740, 743 (1939) (urging Supreme Court not to apply Erie doctrine to international law in
federal courts)).
208. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2093.
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the ratification of the instrument by state conventions, but also, and perhaps as importantly, the acceptance by the people of such vital aspects of
the settlement as the institution ofjudicial review (vital because it in tum
facilitated further settlements). This just goes to show that, if anything,
the general acceptance of a principle is more important to its status as law
than the enshrinement of that principle in a text. The principle that treaties in the United States have the force of domestic law is both enshrined
in text and, until now at least, has been generally accepted.
Precisely because the principle is enshrined in the Constitution, the
proposition that treaties have the status of federal law stands on considerably firmer ground than the claim that customary international law is federallaw. Indeed, for this reason, I had regarded the proposition as immune from attack. On this point, I am happy to have been proved
wrong. Professor Yoo has performed a valuable service by initiating this
exchange. It is healthy for a theory, no matter how ·widely adhered to, to
be challenged from time to time.2° 9 In law, unlike other disciplines, the
fact that an interpretation is widely accepted itself counts as a reason to
retain it. But, since it is not a conclusive reason, it is useful to be reminded that an interpretation has more going for it than that. Professor
Yoo's article and the responses it has generated have helped to show that
sometimes a point of law is not just settled, but settled right.
CODA
In his Rejoinder, ProfessorYoo attempts to supply persuasive textual,
structural, and doctrinal arguments in defense of his position that our
Constitution did not reject but "continue[d] the British system" concerning the status of treaties as domestic law. 21° He aptly captures the rule he
claims our Constitution establishes in an epigram from Frederick
Maitland: "Suppose the queen contracts ·with France that English iron or
coal shall not be exported to France-until a statute has been passed
forbidding exportation, one may export and laugh at the treaty. "211 Professor Yoo's claim that this is the rule established by our Constitution,
which declares treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land," is untenable
from a textual, structural, and doctrinal perspective.
Preliminarily, I note that Yoo is not altogether successful in clarifying
exactly what his position is. He describes a hard position, which he appears to regard as the correct interpretation of the Constitution from a
textual and structural perspective. But, recognizing that the hard posi209. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 97, 108 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1985) (1859) ("[H]owever true [an opinion] may be, if it is not fully, frequently,
and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.... [Even if] the
received opinion [is] true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear
apprehension and deep feeling of its truth.").
210. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2230.
211. Id. at 2227 (quoting Frederick W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of
England 425 (1908)).
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tion is untenable from a doctrinal perspective, he offers in the alternative
a softer position. The hard position is that treaties that address matters
falling within the scope of Article I are non-self-executing and thus require legislative implementation, even if they purport to be self-executing, while treaties that address matters falling outside Article I are selfexecuting.2I2 The softer position is that treaties regulating matters within
the scope of Article I are non-self-executing unless the treatymakers
clearly stated that the treaty is self-executing (i.e., a presumption of nonself-execution).213 There is an ambiguity, however, concerning whatYoo
thinks legislation is needed for. In describing the hard and soft rules,
Yoo states that the treaties would not be enforceable in courts without
such legislation.21 4 But in the portion of the Rejoinder responding to
Professor Flaherty, Yoo dismisses some of the statements Flaherty relies
on as irrelevant because they merely "show that treaties were understood
to be supreme over contrary state law."2 15 "'Globalism' does not dispute
this conclusion, but addresses the different question of the relationship
between treaties and the federal legislative power."21 6
The two questions, however, are not in fact different. The self-execution question is a mixed question of federalism and separation of powers:
A self-executing treaty is a treaty that preempts inconsistent state law without the need for action by the federal legislature, and a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not preempt state law without such action. In
stating that "Globalism" does not dispute that treaties preempt inconsistent state laws, Yoo suggests that, under his hard rule, a treaty falling
within the scope of Article I does preempt inconsistent state law but does
not prevail over prior federal law. This, however, would be less a thesis
about self-execution than about the hierarchy of the forms of federal law,
an issue addressed by the last-in-time rule, under which treaties and statutes are understood to have equivalent stature and hence the last in time
prevails. Yoo's Rejoinder takes on the last-in-time rule in a footnote,2I 7
but if this was his principal target, I'm afraid I completely misapprehended the point of "Globalism." On the assumption that he means to
advance a thesis about self-execution, I shall address the hard and soft
rules as he sometimes describes them: A treaty within the scope of Article
I is, either categorically or presumptively, unenforceable in courts unless

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See id. at 2220.
See id.
See id. at 2248.
Id. at 2224.
Id.
See id. at 2243 n.93.
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implemented by statute. 218 I note, however, that this deprives his critique
of Professor Flaherty's Response of what little force it had. 219
In addressing Yoo's defense of these positions, I shall begin with his
hard position, as that is what he appears to regard as the correct interpretation of the Constitution from a textual and structural perspective. He
retreats to his soft position only because he recognizes that his hard position is untenable in light ofjudicial doctrine. I shall address his soft position, therefore, only in connection with his doctrinal arguments. I also
note thatYoo appears to buttress some ofhis textual and structural arguments by reference to the ratification debates he discussed in "Globalism." His extensive discussion of those debates, however, led him to conclude only that the original understanding did not conclusively or
definitively establish the correctness of the prevailing view, and thus required a shifting of the debate to textual, structural, and doctrinal arguments. If the originalist evidence, taken as a whole, is inconclusive, then
Yoo cannot in good faith smuggle originalist arguments into the textual,
structural, and doctrinal debate.
In response to my textual critique of his thesis, Professor Yoo disputes my claim that "law," as that term is used in the Supremacy Clause,
entails presumptive judicial enforceability. This is not the place to defend further the conceptual link between law and courts.22o Suffice it to
say that Yoo does not develop an alternative understanding of "law"
under which the treaties that he would regard as non-self-executing
would be law. He tentatively advances a view of "law" that resembles the
one I attributed to Professor Henkin above: Even if a norm is not judicially enforceable, it is law as long as it is "binding" on those addressed by
the norm. 221 Yoo states that "[a] constitutional, statutory, or treaty provi218. This interpretation is supported by id. at 2239 (criticizing me for claiming that
all treaties "automatically preempt inconsistent state law"); id. at 2254 (recognizing that a
treaty that falls within the "exclusive powers of the states" (and apparently only such a
treaty) can be enforced by the judiciary "against inconsistent state law.").
219. Under the approach to self-execution elaborated in "Four Doctrines," treaties
falling into the "private right of action" category of non-self-executing treaties would
preempt inconsistent state laws, see Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 719-22,
while treaties in the other three categories would not. As noted above, supra Part III.B.4,
although portions of"Globalism" appeared to embrace the "private right of action" version
of non-self-execution, most of "Globalism" seemed to take the position that non-selfexecuting treaties lack domestic legal force (and thus would not preempt inconsistent state
laws). The Rejoinder appears to resolve the conflict by embracing the latter view; it does
not appear to take the position that a non-self-executing treaty is one that does not create a
private right of action but is otherwise enforceable in court. Cf. Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2244 (analogizing his proposed rule to "[t]he Court's strict
test on private rights of action" to the extent the latter test "means that numerous federal
statutory provisions cannot be enforced in court"). My discussion in the text thus refers to
treaties that are non-self-executing in the other three senses. See also supra note 86.
220. I offer an extended defense in Vazquez, Constitution as Law of the Land, supra
note 88.
221. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 n.119. See supra text
accompanying note 125.
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sion can achieve 'law of the land' status through presidential or congressional, rather than judicial, action," 222 and hence "[o]ne might read the
'Law of the Land' phrase as an affirmative duty of the federal government, as a whole, to give effect to constitutional, statutory, or treaty
obligations. "223
But this position is inconsistent with the position he took in "Globalism,"224 and repeats in the Rejoinder, that, under his view, "the executive
and legislative branches would remain free to break the treaty. "225 How can
the executive and legislative branches be legally free to break a treaty if
the treaty is legally "binding" and the federal government has the "affirmative duty" to give it effect? That Professor Yoo does not in fact believe
that a non-self-executing treaty has the force of domestic law is shown by
his descriptions of the British rule, which he claims our Constitution
"continue[s],"226 most notably his quotation from Maitland that one may
"laugh at" treaties until they are implemented by statute. 227 Although he
is more careful in the Rejoinder to avoid saying that non-self-executing
treaties lack the force of internal law, even here this view occasionally
surfaces.228 Finally, the logic of his textual argument seems to require
the conclusion that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of domestic
law. As discussed below, his textual argument rests on the idea that to
recognize a treaty as self-executing would be to give it the force oflegislation and thus to intrude on Article I's grant of exclusive legislative power
to Congress. If the problem is solved by regarding treaties falling within
the Article I legislative power as non-self-executing, it is only because to
do so is to deny such treaties the status of law. 229
Yoo also disputes my argument that "Law of the Land" status entails
presumptive judicial enforceability by pointing to the "judges" portion of
the Supremacy Clause. 230 He argnes that, if "Law of the Land" status
222. Yoo, Treades and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249. In fact, no such
acdon is necessary, as the Consdtudon itself grants those three types of norms "'law of the
land' status." I shall read Professor Yoo's statement as expressing the view that a norm can
have the status of law of the land even if its enforcement has been allocated to branches
other than the judiciary.
223. Id.
224. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1979 (non-self-execudon gives polidcal branches
the discretion to determine how or whether to comply with treaty obligations).
225. Yoo, Treades and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2249 (emphasis added).
226. Id. at 2229-30.
227. See supra text accompanying note 21!.
228. See, e.g., Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2223 (arguing
that the Consdtudon was designed to give the House the power to "block a treaty's
domesdc effect" "by withholding implementation").
229. That he does not regard a non-self-execudng treaty as having the force of
domestic law is suggested as well by his apparent recognition that his posidon would be
wholly implausible if he were contending that all treaties are non-self-execudng. See infra
text accompanying note 244.
230. This is sometimes referred to as the judges Clause," see Evan H. Caminker,
Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199, 207.
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implied judicial enforceability, it would have been redundant to go on to
direct state judges to give effect to the Constitution, federal statutes and
treaties notwithstanding inconsistent state laws. This argument cannot
get Yoo anywhere. If the latter portion is superfluous, then both portions
support my position; if it is not superfluous, then the latter portion supports it instead of the former. I assume that Yoo is not making the untenable argument that state judges are required to enforce treaties but federal judges are not. If so, he would have to contend with the unanimity of
opinion since the Founding that federal and not just state judges are
bound by federal statutes and the Constitution, to say nothing of treaties.
Most likely, the clause mentions state judges and not federal judges because the former and not the latter were thought to need a specific instruction to disregard inconsistent state law. If anything, the reference to
state judges reinforces the link between law and courts that is the basis of
the presumption I defend.
In disputing my claim that the Supremacy Clause is self-executing
with respect to treaties, Yoo relies as well on the fact that Article III is not
self-executing with respect to the lower federal courts.231 I fail to see how
this fact supports his argument. It is true that the Founders opted to
leave the decision whether to create lower federal courts to the legislature. The default regime for judicially enforcing the supreme Law of the
Land was through litigation in the state courts, with an appeal to the
Supreme Court. This is how treaty cases reached the Supreme Court for
much of our history. The only relevance of this regime, known as the
Madisonian Compromise, to the issue under discussion here is that it
shows that the Founders knew how to write a non-self-executing constitutional provision when they wanted to. Article III makes it clear that the
lower federal courts shall exist only if Congress creates them; Article VI,
by contrast, simply declares treaties to be the "supreme Law of the Land."
Yoo fares no better in presenting affirmative defenses of his own position. The textual support Yoo musters for his hard position is exceedingly weak. His claim, as noted, is that giving a treaty self-executing effect
is to treat the treaty as legislation, yet the Constitution's placement of the
treatymaking power within Article II shows that treatymaking was regarded as an executive power. Giving self-executing effect to such executive action would violate Article I's vesting of the legislative power exclusively in Congress. Even if we credited each of those textual points, Yoo
would have established at best a conflict among constitutional texts. It is
indisputable, after all, that Article II allocates the treatymaking power to
the President, with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and that Article VI gives treaties the status of "law of the land, and therefore domestic
law." 232 Thus, if we equate "legislation" and "law," as Yoo does, then the
combination of Articles II and VI would produce a clear allocation of
231. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2246.
232. Id. at 2249 n.119.
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legislative power to the President (and Senate). If this conflicts with Article I, the solution would appear to be to give effect to the more specific
provisions, which in this case would be the ones specifically addressing
treaties. In fact, though, there is no necessary conflict, as the text of Article I allocates to the Congress only the legislative powers "herein
granted." The constitutional text can thus easily be read to provide that
only the legislative powers granted in Article I are vested in Congress,
leaving open the possibility that legislative powers granted in other articles might rest elsewhere. 233
Moreover, Yoo's textual argument fails to explain why a treaty that
regulates matters falling outside the legislative power as enumerated in
Article I can be self-executing. If the problem is that giving treaties domestic effect violates the textual grant of the legislative power to Congress, then the problem would seem to extend to any Article II treaty.
Yoo defends this aspect of his rule by noting that a treaty that regulates matters outside Article I does not impinge Congress's prerogatives,
as by hypothesis Congress lacks any power in the matter. This is not a
textual argument but a structural one.234 From a structural perspective,
however, Yoo's position seems, if possible, even more problematic. It is
true that Congress cannot complain if the treatymakers are granted the
power to legislate on matters beyond the scope of its legislative powers,
but, as Yoo recognizes, the legislative power was limited not to protect
Congress but to protect the states and the people.235 Although Yoo criticizes my position because it would permit an easy circumvention of federalism limits,236 he overlooks the fact that his proposal would permit the
very same thing. National power would remain precisely as broad under
his theory, as the Congress would retain the power to implement treaties
that fall within Article I and the treatymakers would retain the power to
"legislate" on matters falling beyond the scope of Article I.
The national power would be structured differendy under his theory,
as it would take the consent of the House to implement a treaty falling
233. Although I am here engaging in a purely textual argument, I am unaware of any
evidence that the Framers intended something different by the phrase "herein granted."
To the contrary, the fact that the proposal to add the phrase to Article I was made by
Gouverneur Morris, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale LJ.
1725, 1789-91 (1996), the same man who had earlier stressed that "treaties were to be
'laws,'" 2 Farrand, Records, supra note 20, at 390, indicates that he regarded treatymaking
as a quasi-legislative power allocated to the President and Senate.
234. Yoo also seeks to derive support from the ratification debates he discusses. See,
e.g., Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2222 n.17. But, for the reasons
noted above, reliance on such evidence is inconsistent with Yoo's own conclusion that,
taken as a whole, the debates are inconclusive. See supra text accompanying notes
219-220.
235. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2234.
236. See id. at 2237 ("In making treaties self-executing, Vazquez and other
internationalists would create a potentially limitless legislative power."); id. at 2238 ("Selfexecution also would free the treatymakers from federalism limitations, which
internationalists claim do not apply to treaties.").
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within the scope of Article I. Yoo defends this result as more consistent
with the constitutional structure because it subjects international agreements to the difficult procedures the Founders deliberately required
before state law could be preempted by federal law, and he argues that it
protects the principle of popular sovereignty because it requires the participation of the most representative part of the legislature. 237 He hypothesizes horrible changes that the treatymakers might effectuate if
freed of these structural safeguards, such as changes in the separation of
powers system as we know it. 238 My own view is that the treatymaking
power is subject to a structural safeguard that is at least as effective as
those to which the legislative power is subject: the requirement of the
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. 239 It is inconceivable to me that twothirds of the Senate would agree to the sorts of horribles Yoo parades.
Even Yoo recognizes that it is "perhaps unlikely" that a treaty would gain
the support of two-thirds of the Senate without having the support of a
m<9ority of the House. 240 Indeed, the practice of giving domestic legal
force to international agreements through ordinary legislation has arisen
precisely because of the difficulty of getting two-thirds of the Senate to
agree on anything.241
If I did think that the treatymaking process lacked adequate safeguards against unwise or unpopular laws, I would not find Yoo's solution
very appealing. Yoo would allow the hypothetically unwise or unpopular
treaties to take direct effect precisely in those categories of cases that,
according to Article I, are least deserving of federal attention. I would
take some comfort from the fact that the federal legislative power today is
quite broad; the smaller the sphere reserved to the states by Article I, the
smaller the sphere in which treaties could be self-executing. But, as the
Supreme Court frequently notes, as originally understood, "[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government" were
thought to be "few and defined," while those reserved to the states were
237. See id. at 2240.
238. See id. at 2237.
239. See Vazquez, Treaty Power, supra note 146, at 1339.
240. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2240 n.79.
241. Cf. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 799, 801, 837-42 (1995) (linking rise of congressional-executive agreements to
difficulty of obtaining Senate consent for Versailles treaty). If anything, the more
significant popular sovereignty objection to the treatymaking power is that it makes it too
hard to make treaties, not too easy. One-third of the Senate, representing a minuscule
portion of the national electorate, can block a treaty having broad popular support. A
version of this objection infects the ordinary legislative process. Indeed, it is more likely,
given the make-up of the Senate, that a piece of ordinary legislation will fail to pass even
though it is supported by a majority of the national electorate than that a treaty will be
approved even though it is not supported by a majority of the electorate. Indeed, the
composition of the Senate shows clearly that the Founders did not ultimately embrace the
pure form of popular sovereignty on which Yoo's arguments are grounded. Those
arguments would perhaps support a constitutional amendment rejecting the Great
Compromise, but they are not a basis for interpreting the Constitution we now have.
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thought to be "numerous and indefinite."242 If we agreed with Yoo that
the treatymaking process lacks adequate safeguards, it is implausible to
read the Constitution as approving this "constitutionally dangerous"243
process for what was considered the broad and indefinite area othenvise
resexved to the states, and as correcting the problem only for the narrow
area delegated to Congress under Article I.
If we assumed the area resexved to the states by Article I to be narrow, on the other hand, Yoo would face a different problem. Yoo recognizes in the end that his position would be untenable from a textual
standpoint if he would deny self-executing effect to all treaties, 244 but he
maintains that he is not vulnerable to this objection because he accepts
that treaties can be self-executing if they regulate matters outside Article
I.245 Given the Supremacy Clause's reference to "all Treaties," however,
this textual defense is unconvincing if only a small subset of treaties in
fact are self-executing and hence the law of the land.
Professor Yoo's proposal appears to be an attempt to find a clever
·way out of a tight box." But there is no discernable textual or structural
reason for a rule in which a treaty that falls within the Article I legislative
power lacks domestic legal effect while a treaty falling outside that power
has such effect. The sole purpose of such a rule appears to be to presexve
some category of treaty for the Supremacy Clause to operate on. But Yoo
at best escapes from a tight textual box only to find himself in an even
tighter structural box. A broad view of the federal legislative power would
mean that the text's reference to "all Treaties" implausibly refers only to a
small subset of treaties. A narrow view of federal power under Article I,
on the other hand, would mean that Congress implausibly decided to
make a constitutionally dangerous structure applicable to a broad range
of situations, correcting the problem only for a narrow subset. The ·way
out of this Catch-22 is of course to reject Yoo's claim that the treatymaking power is dangerously lacking safeguards against un'vise or unpopular
laws. But this leaves his structural argument without its linchpin.246
Yoo fares no better with doctrinal arguments. He argues that Ware v.
Hyfton247 is consistent with his hard rule because the treaty involved in

the case addressed matters outside the scope of Article I. 248 It is difficult

242. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45
(James Madison)).
243. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256.
244. See id. at 2254.
245. See id.
246. I note that Yoo finds Professor Bradley's argument that the treatymaking power
is limited by Article I to be "powerful." Id. at 2239 n.76. Since Yoo himself ultimately
concedes that his rule is tenable only to the extent it would recognize at least a small sliver
of treaties as self-executing, Yoo's argument depends in the end on a rejection of this
"powerful" argument. While I have not been convinced by Professor Bradley's argument, I
do find it far more plausible than Yoo's position on self-execution.
247. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
248. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2251.
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to evaluate this argument because the Court at the time had not yet construed the scope of the Commerce Power. What is most telling about
Ware is that the Court saw no need to consider the scope of the Commerce Power before giving self-executing effect to the treaty. Yoo in the
end recognizes that his hard rule is inconsistent with judicial doctrine,249
and for this reason he proffers in the alternative a softer rule, under
which treaties that fall within the Article I power are self-executing only if
the treatymakers attach a clear statement that they are self-executing.250
Yoo recognizes that there are numerous Supreme Court cases in which
treaties were given effect even though there was neither implementing
legislation nor a clear statement of self-execution, but he argnes that
some of them are consistent with his theory because they addressed matters beyond the scope of Article I.251 He includes in this category the
many cases giving effect to the Warsaw Convention. 25 2 The claim that a
treaty addressing the liability of foreign and domestic air carriers falls
outside the scope of the foreign commerce clause is mystifYing. Even
though there admittedly were no air carriers at the time of the framing, I
doubt that any Justice would say that a regulation of such carriers falls
within the exclusive legislative power of the states. In any event, Yoo
makes no attempt to square his theory with the many other Supreme
Court decisions that conflict with it.253
Yoo also relies heavily on the Executive's recent practice of attaching
non-self-execution declarations to treaties.25 4 The meaning and effect of
such declarations has yet to be addressed by the Court, but, more importantly for present purposes, the practice of attaching such declarations to
treaties is fully consistent with the rule I defend-that treaties are presumptively self-executing. Yoo claims that these declarations "may have
signaled the political branches' agreement that non-self-execution should
become the general rule applied to all treaties."255 Even assuming such a
view were relevant to a constitutional interpretation,256 it is hard to see
249. See id. at 2254-55.
250. See id. at 2220.
251. See id. at 2254 n.138.
252. See id.
253. None of the cases cited supra note 147 involved treaties that included anything
resembling the sort of clear statement Professor Yoo would require.
254. See Yoo, Treaties and Public lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256-57.
255. 1d. at 2257.
256. Cf. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408
(1990), in which the Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that an executive branch
statement on a legal question implicating foreign affairs was not binding on the courts. In
Kirkpatrick , the Court narrowed the Act-of-State Doctrine on the basis of the principle that
"Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases
and controversies properly presented to them." ld. at 409. Yoo notes that "a non-selfexecution rule ... is consistent with other developments in foreign relations law that have
sought to limit judicial discretion in areas such as the act of state doctrine, the political
question doctrine, and donnant preemption." Yoo, Treaties and Public lawmaking, supra
note 3, at 2256. That may be so, but, as Kirkpatrick shows, judicial discretion can be limited
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how the declarations reflect such a view. If the political branches had
embraced Yoo's position, they would have regarded such declarations as
superfluous.
Professor Yoo also makes a number of broad separation of powers
arguments, many of them relying on the political question doctrine. I
completely agree that the non-self-execution concept has strong affinities
with the political question doctrine. Indeed, I regard the former doctrine as the treaty-law counterpart to the latter. One point of my earlier
writings has been that the political question doctrine, as applied to constitutional and statutory norms, is extremely narrow, and that the corresponding doctrine for treaties should be equally narrow.257 Yoo proposes
a radically different abstention rule with respect to treaties, but he paints
with too broad a brush. He relies on cases that he reads to require judicial deference to the other branches in matters that implicate foreign
affairs, but these cases either did not involve treaties and have no implications for the self-execution question, 258 or merely affirmed that treaties
can be trumped by later legislation,259 or are othenvise inapposite.260 By
contrast, when the Court has been urged by the Executive to reject treatybased claims on non-self-execution (or related lack-of-standing) grounds,
it has declined to do so.261 If the decisions Yoo cites did suggest that
courts must avoid adjudicating cases based on treaties, they would be vulnerable to a powerful objection based on the text of the Constitution,
which explicitly instructs judges to give effect to treaties. But they do not.
What is most noteworthy about the Supreme Court's decisions is that the
Court has only once unambiguously denied relief on the ground that the
treaty at issue was non-self-executing, and it later found even that treaty to
be self-executing.262
by expanding the judicial role as well as by contracting it. Thus, the trend of diminishing
judicial discretion in the foreign affairs area is as consistent with the traditional rule as with
the one Yoo advocates-indeed, more so, in light of Kirkpatrick.
257. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8, at 716. For elaboration, see Vazquez,
Constitution as Law of the Land, supra note 88; see also DavidJ. Bederman, Deference or
Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1439, 1441 (1999)
(arguing that "the 'pure' form of the political question doctrine is largely out of favor
today in the Supreme Court, even with respect to foreign affairs controversies").
258. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2247-48 (relying on
Baker v. Carr and Curlw-Wright).
259. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 1969-71 (relying on the Head Money Cases
and Whitney v. Rnbcrtson).
260. Some of the cases Yoo relies on are lower court decisions, and others plurality
opinions. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2247 (citing Goldwater
v. Carter and lower court cases dismissing challenges to the Vietnam War).
261. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 143.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 106-112; see also Vazquez, Four Doctrines,
supra note 8, at 716 & n.96.
ProfessorYoo cites a number oflower court decisions in support of various aspects of
his thesis, including most notably Judge Bark's sole concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J. concurring). See Yoo,
Globalism, supra note 1, at 1973 n.82. But as he himself admits, the lower courts are
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Finally, Professor Yoo makes policy arguments in favor of his constitutional interpretation that belong instead in an article urging a constitutional amendment. For example, he says that I "argue that the House is
ill-suited for the secrecy needed for diplomacy. "263 I actually did not express a view on that point; I merely noted that the Founders held that
view·.2 64 Yoo's argument that this view is no longer tenable 265 makes it
manifest that his beef is with the arrangement the Constitution establishes, not anyone's interpretation of it. If he is right that the House is no
longer ill-suited for the secrecy needed for diplomacy, that would be a
reason to reject the Framers' decision to deny the House a role in the
making of treaties.266 But it would not be a reason to deny treaties that
are already in force the status of domestic law. Even less would it be a
avowedly confused by the self-execution doctrine. See id. at 1958. I attempt to show in
"Four Doctrines" that most of the lower court decisions are consistent with my view. See
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 8. In any event, while constitutional text perhaps may
yield to Supreme Court decisions, it cannot in my view yield to lower court decisions,
particularly confusing or ambiguous lower court decisions that conflict with other lower
court decisions.
Yoo argues that the APA and section 1983 do not confer a right of action for violations
of treaties, as they only apply to violations of federal "law." See Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2256 n.140. Here, as elsewhere, he overlooks that treaties are
law. On the applicability of the APA and section 1983 to treaties, see generally Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 8, at 1143-57. Congress knows how to exclude treaty
claims from its remedial statutes when it wants to. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). Yoo
is on firmer ground when he notes, somewhat inconsistently, that, because treaties are law,
the conclusion that appropriations require House action is unsupported by the
constitutional provision that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2236 n.61. But the need for House action
derives indirect textual support from the related Origination Clause. U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 7, cl. 1. In any event, the requirement of House action for appropriations and for other
limited purposes does not support the claim that House action is necessary to accomplish
anything falling within the scope of Article I.
Yoo also cites the APA in support of the proposition that treaties should generally be
unenforceable in courts, noting that "[a)dministrative law schemes recognize that certain
federal mandates are to be enforced by the executive branch, rather than by Congress or
the courts." Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2244-45. But the APA
actually supports a presumption ofjudicial enforceability. As the Court noted in the case
Yoo cites, there is a strong presumption in favor ofjudicial review, a presumption that can
be overcome only by "clear and convincing evidence of a legislative intent to restrict access
to judicial review." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2245 n.97. The exception for action "committed to agency
discretion," moreover, is "very narrow" and covers cases in which there is "no law to apply."
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because
treaties are "law," the analogy Yoo draws would appear to be inapt.
263. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2241.
264. Indeed, I merely quoted his statement that the Founders held that view. See
supra note 22 (citingYoo, Globalism, supra note 1, at 2036).
265. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 3, at 2241.
266. Arguably we have already done this through an informal constitutional
amendment. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 241.
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reason to interpret the existing Constitution as denying treaties the status
of domestic law. To read the Supremacy Clause that way would be to
display the same cavalier attitude towards the Constitution that Professor
Yoo claims the Framers took towards treaties. He is mistaken when he
claims that the Framers thought it acceptable to laugh at treaties, and he
is mistaken when he claims that constitutional text, doctrine, and structure tolerate it.
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